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A. The Information Society
Transborder data flow, the transfer of computer readable in-
formation across national borders, has become a matter of interna-
tional concern. With the marriage of satellites and computers,
groups as diverse as religious organizations and terrorist bands in
microseconds can transfer vast amounts of the world's accumu-
lated knowledge simultaneously to users around the globe. The
politics and economics of information access are complex. The new
technologies may disrupt relationships between nation states and
their nationals, whether individuals or corporate entities. For ex-
ample, as computerized information systems facilitate interna-
tional trade and financial transactions, multinational businesses
are proliferating. Indeed, improved transborder data flow will facil-
itate global contacts of all varieties as users form their own distrib-
uted computer networks1 and employ them for their own purposes.
* Chairman of Communications Division of Science and Technology Section of the
American Bar Association.
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Control Data Corporation and the
assistance of the members of the American Bar Association Science and Technology Section
Project on International Information Networks, who contributed to the analysis. The author
researched this Article while a Visiting Scholar at the Yale University Law School, and she
is indebted to Professors Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman for their insight into the
international law aspects of the Article. The author takes full responsibility for the material
contained in this Article, and the reader should not attribute any of the conclusions to any
organization or group with which the author has been or is now affiliated.
1. A distributed computer network facilitating communication among numerous users
relies upon the implementation of an organizational pattern that links the users' communi-
cation equipment, the transmission facilities, and the central computer. See, e.g., S. HnLTz &
M. TUROFF, THE NrwORK NATION: HUMAN COMMUNICATION VIA COMPUTER (1978). Such net-
works are used for many purposes, for example, to support local transactions and to keep
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Technological advances in transnational communication greatly
enhance the ability of users to pursue both eleemosynary and crim-
inal purposes. Whether individual users of international systems
will achieve their goals, either good or evil, will depend upon the
policies and practices concerning transborder data flow that the
nation states adopt. Individuals, groups, or organizations may in-
fluence the accommodation of the legal system to the new techno-
logical environment only if they understand which goals are desira-
ble, the values that are at stake, and the options that are available.
This Article reviews the current global ferment in policy directives
concerning transborder data flows and projects the options that in-
dividuals, organizations, and governments might choose to attain
their objectives.
The position of the United States is changing in the world de-
bate on global governance. In 1945 the United States provided the
leadership to establish an international forum for the discussion of
human rights and the minimization of armed conflict.' In 1962 the
United States led the world into an international common carrier
satellite system, INTELSAT.3 Despite its traditional stance of en-
couraging worldwide cooperation on information technology, how-
ever, the United States seems increasingly unready, unwilling, and
even unable to lead the world community into an international sys-
tem of information exchange that maximizes shared use of infor-
mation resources. As the United States sees its leadership position
the information consistent with information in other computers at remote locations. Typical
applications are airline reservations, retail point of sale transactions, credit verification, elec-
tronic funds transfers, teleconferencing, cooperative research, and shared creative efforts.
For detailed presentation of current technical issues in computer networks in communica-
tion systems, see INSTITUTION OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, COMPUTER NETWORKING SYMPO-
SIUM (1981); UNIVERSITf DE LIAGE, COMPUTER NETWORK PROTOCOLS (1978).
2. Representatives of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
the United Kingdom reached agreements at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in Wash-
ington, D.C., 1944, for the establishment of a general international organization to maintain
international peace and security. See UNrrD STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DUMBARTON
OAKS DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1944). The United Nations Conference
on International Organization drafted the Charter of the United Nations at San Francisco
from April 25 to June 26, 1945, and it became effective October 24, 1945. A COMPREHENSIVE
HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 107 n.1 (1978).
3. The Communications Satellite Corporation organized in 1962 led to the establish-
ment of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) in 1964.
INTELSAT is a "102-member consortium of governments which operates very much like a
commercial entity." Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L.
1, 7 n.27 (1980). For a discussion of INTELSAT, its services, and criticisms of the system,
see infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the benefits the United States might reap by leading the world
community into an international system of information exchange, see Address by Arthur C.
[Vol. 36:985986
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eroded by strong competitors in the international information mar-
ketplace, the pendulum of American opinion on these policy ques-
tions swings in the opposite direction towards information protec-
tionism, information independence, and even information
indifference.
5
Information is the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and
business decisions. Power resides in those entities that control the
communications system and consequently the gathering, process-
ing, distribution, and storage of information. In primitive societies
the individuals who controlled information and information ex-
change stored the data in human brains and distributed it in face-
to-face encounters over which they had exclusive control. In these
societies the death of a learned brain was the loss of a human li-
brary. "Recorded history" emerged with the technology of writing
on stone, papyrus, or paper. Since the time of Marco Polo or ear-
lier, merchants have circled the globe in search of gold, spices, and
other precious cargo. Monks have established monasteries in the
far corners of the most remote and inaccessible places to carry
their version of the truth to the heathens. Chinese bureaucrats,
Roman soldiers, Greek philosophers, American moviemakers and
Japanese television manufacturers all have pursued a global mar-
ketplace in both manufactured goods and information products.
Today, tourists and bankers alike enjoy the benefits of a worldwide
system. In the modern world electronic brains gather, store, and
distribute vast amounts of information. Satellites circling the globe
can place an electronic eye over a third of the earth's surface, col-
lect information, and deliver it to any other spot on earth instanta-
neously. The coupling of computers with advanced communica-
tions systems can merge voice, image, text, and symbols to render
obsolete the customary legal distinctions that people have used to
govern the delivery of information by telegraphy, telephone, televi-
sion, or newsprint.6
The very existence of information technology is threatening to
Clarke to the United Nations Committee on Disarmament (Aug. 31, 1982), reprinted in 128
CONG. Rac. E4307-09 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1982) (statement of Rep. Brown).
5. Indeed, the most recent U.S. policy analysis evidences both myopia and paranoia.
See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST
Sass., U.S. LONG-RANGE GoALs IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION Xi-
xii (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as NTIA Report], which is the best available his-
torical documentation of current United States policies and organizational problems al-
though it makes little mention of any responsibilities the United States might have in help-
ing to develop and to maintain a global system of telecommunications.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 194-204.
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nation states. A satellite "footprint"7 has great difficulty honoring
national boundaries. The beam can remain within the national ter-
ritorial limits only over land masses that are geographically iso-
lated, like Australia, or vast, like the Soviet Union or the People's
Republic of China. Computers do not question the motives of their
masters. Thus, information wars are brewing over how govern-
ments and private industries will develop these computerized in-
formation systems and what kinds of political and social systems
will evolve in response to their existence.
The United States has a great stake in the heated debate over
transborder data flow. As a developer of both satellites and com-
puters, it still leads the world in the manufacture of telematics
hardware.8 The United States also is the world's largest supplier of
data bases for the distribution and management of information.
Yet, strong competition threatens the country's superiority. Japan,
for example, has established a goal of becoming an "Information
Society" by the end of the 1980's.9 Moreover, potential competitors
like Canada and France see telematics as a major source of eco-
nomic strength. 10 Smaller countries view the telematics infrastruc-
ture as crucial to their own economic development plans for indus-
trialization. 1" Thus, the health of the American economy is at
7. A satellite footprint is the area on the earth's surface covered by the satellite's
beam. R. FREEMAN, TELECOMMUNICATION TRANSMISSION HANDBOOK 346, 612-13 (2d ed. 1981).
For example, the LANDSAT satellite system uses an area coverage scanner, which collects
data in areas approximately 115 miles square. A return beam relays the data to earth sta-
tions in a beam which covers approximately 61 miles square. For a discussion of the LAND-
SAT system, see RYDER'S STANDARD GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE: THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 176-77 (1981); infra part III, section C.
8. D. SCHILLER, THE U.S. OFFENSIVE IN INTERNATIONAL TELEMATICS 148 (1982). "Esti-
mates for the telecommunications equipment market in 1987 indicate a U.S. market of
about $34 billion and a world market of just under $60 billion." NTIA Report, supra note 5,
at 156.
9. See HousE Comm. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW:
FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980); Fishman,
supra note 3, at 8 & n.30.
10. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 7-10.
11. See, e.g., Bortnick, International Information Flow: The Developing World Per-
spective, 14 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 333, 334-37 (1981) (developing nations' desire for informa-
tion technology and barriers to this goal); Brizida, The Brazilian Transborder Data Flow
Policy, TRANSNAT'L DATA REP., vol. 4, no. 3, at 19 (1980) ("boom" in need for transborder
data flow makes its development high priority in Brazil); Address by R.E. Butler, Secretary-
General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), before the Pacific Telecom-
munications Council 6 (Jan. 18, 1983) ("stimulating telecommunications development in the
developing world" a key goal of ITU); J. Dans, Strategy for the Integration of the Telecom-
munications Sector in a Developing Country Under a Free Enterprise Economy 3 (June 7,




stake. American foreign investment is far greater than that of any
other nation state ($190 billion in 1979).12 Much of this investment
is in service industries, such as restaurant franchises that are as
popular in Japan as in the United States. United States-based con-
sultants travel the globe offering advice on manufacturing projects
that may be receiving capital and other input from both domestic
and foreign sources. Transborder data flow has become indispensa-
ble to the very existence of transnational enterprise and to the cur-
rently flourishing global marketplace. The service sector of the
American economy alone employs more than half the nation's
workers and contributes over a third of its exports. Ser-
vices-especially information services-are the most rapidly grow-
ing economic sector both domestically and abroad.'" In addition,
American consumers' insatiable appetite for imported goods has
made the United States less self-sufficient than it once was. Thus,
free transborder data flow may be essential to national survival in
an increasingly interdependent global economy.
Two futurists who have examined the potential impact of
computer technology on the world have developed similar visions
of the characteristics of an information society. Yoneji Masuda has
observed that such a society amplifies the mental power of humans
while it minimizes their physical labor. In addition, an information
society transforms the exchange economy into a synergistic econ-
omy in which society pursues social goals through voluntary infor-
mation rather than geographically based communities. This society
maximizes self-actualization and self-fulfillment rather than physi-
cal acquisition of durable goods, increases participatory democracy
and social feedback mechanisms, and promotes "the spirit of
globalism, a symbiosis in which man and nature can live together
in harmony .... ", Exactly ten years after Mr. Masuda presented
his ideas, Harlan Cleveland pronounced his notion of desirable
goals for an information society. He observed that in an economy
based upon abundant, synergistic, energy conservative information
resources should encourage spreading of benefits rather than con-
centration of wealth, maximization of choice rather than suppres-
sion of diversity, and planning in collegial and participatory deci-
sion-making about shared social goals.1 5 These visions of social
12. D. SCHILLER, supra note 8, at 108 (1982).
13. HousE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 26.
14. MASUDA, THE INFORMATION SocIETY As POST-INDuSTRIAL SocIETY, 33 (1981).
15. Cleveland, How Leaders Must Change in the Information Age, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Feb. 16, 1981, at 27, col. 1.
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structure and goals differ from the competitive market model that
Americans have valued throughout their history. Although the
competitive market is entirely appropriate for an industrial society
based upon a mass market and consumer choice in an ever ex-
panding economy, this traditional model may be entirely inappro-
priate and counterproductive for an information society in a glob-
ally interdependent economy in which citizens must share both
resources and decisions about their allocation.
B. Definitions
Variations in the definitions that commentators have ascribed
to the term "transborder data flows" contribute to the confusion in
current discussions. No ambiguity exists in the definition of
"transborder," which means across national political boundaries, or
"flows," which means movement. No consistent construction, how-
ever, exists for the term "data." According to the dictionary, data
is "that upon which an inference or an argument is based, or from
which an ideal system of any sort is constructed.""6 Data basically
is the raw material from which people develop information and
knowledge. The current primary concern in discussions of trans-
border data flow, however, clearly is about computer-generated in-
formation. People have transported data across geographical
boundary lines in many forms and by many means for centuries.
Therefore, all data presently cannot be of concern; rather, debate
centers around a specific kind of data that a specific type or types
of transmission systems transport. Many descriptions of this data
exist. For example, William Fishman speaks of "electronic move-
ment of data between countries. ' 17 Rein Turn discusses "transmis-
sion over computer-communications systems of automated data to
be processed and stored in foreign data processing systems."18 Eric
Novotny discusses "units of information coded electronically for
processing by one or more digital computers which transfer or pro-
cess the information in more than one nation-state.", Professor
Pool and Mr. Solomon refer to "computer communications,
telecommunications networks .... [d]igitalized transmission
enab[ling] voice and data traffic to be handled in a single mixed
16. WEBSTER'S NE W INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY 671 (2d ed. 1967) (defining "datum,"
the singular form of "data").
17. Fishman, supra note 3, at 1.
18. PAC. TELECOMS. CoNr. Proceedings, 1980 at I-D, 31 (D. Wedemeyer ed.).
19. Novotny, Transborder Data Flows and International Law: A Framework for Pol-
icy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J. INT'- L. 141, 143-44 (1980).
[Vol. 36:985990
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stream of data."20 Mr. Antonelli speaks of "international flows of
data associated with computer communications . -.21 Docu-
ments of the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics discuss
"transmission of data over telecommunications circuits. 2 2 Philip
Lemoine defines transborder data flow as international information
trade in a computer-generated and machine-readable format.23
This definition includes all computer-to-computer, computer-to-
human, and human-to-computer communication.
The Bing Report,24 unlike other works on the subject, ad-
dresses the ambiguities in definition. Most other writings merely
assume that the reader understands the problem well enough to
ignore the definitional difficulties. Bing includes in his report on
legal issues all transport of "data," which means "any representa-
tion of information" over "telecommunications"-defined by the
International Telecommunications Union as wire, radio, optical, or
other electromagnetic means.25 Bing, however, limits his discussion
to all computer services capable of accepting written material in-
cluding electronic mail, information retrieval, teledocuments, and
data processing.26 This definition excludes voice and image
transmissions.27
No doubt exists that the new ferment about transborder data
flow has arisen from the covergence of computer technology, which
stores and processes information, and communications technology,
which permits rapid dissemination of this information to all parts
of the globe by satellite, undersea cable, or conventional radio. The
various definitions of transborder data flow fail to discriminate
with respect to the type of transmission; some descriptions include
the transport of computer tapes across national boundaries by con-
ventional transportation methods, such as an individual taking the
20. Pool & Solomon, Intellectual Property and Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 113, 114-15 (1980).
21. C. Antonelli, Transborder Data Flows and International Business 5 (June 2, 1981)
(written for Expert Group on Transborder Data Flows, Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development).
22. Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics, Issues on Transborder Data Flow Poli-
cies (Sept. 1979) (Documents on Policies for Informatics) (SPIN-230).
23. Lemoine, Transborder Data Flows, INFORMATION SYSTEMS MAGAZiNE, Spring 1979,
No. 30.
24. Bing, Forsberg & Nygaard, Legal Issues Related to Transborder Data Flows (June
2, 1981) (preliminary study for Expert Group on Transborder Data Flows, Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) [hereinafter cited as Bing Report].
25. Id. at 4.




tape by commercial air carrier. Definitions in the work of Mark
Feldman and David Garcia are representative of a flexible, expan-
sive approach:
Man's rapidly developing ability to transfer information across national
boundaries has become a crucial component in our increasingly integrated
world economy. The advent of the computer has revolutionized man's capac-
ity to process and store information. Simultaneously, man's capacity to trans-
mit information has been dramatically increased by a variety of telecommu-
nications innovations, including increasingly effective cable transmissions and
orbiting satellites. Together, these two technologies have resulted in a trans-
border data flow (TDF) essential to expanding international economic
development.2 8
Interesting and complex legal issues arise in the context of the
marriage between computer technology and satellite technology; in
which scientists can merge voice, image, and text into a single sys-
tem with a digital bit stream29 and thus render obsolete the tradi-
tional legal principles that have separated telephony, telegraphy,
television, post, and personal delivery. For example, passport regu-
lations and travel permits that governments use to facilitate or in-
hibit transborder information flows which require personal travel
may be totally inadequate to regulate participants who may see
and hear each other as well as deliver documents through a com-
puter printout in their various locations. Moreover, laws that tradi-
tionally have governed the delivery of messages sent by postal ser-
vices may be unsatisfactory in protecting information delivery by
microwave or satellite circuits from electronic interception.
This Article's examination of the development of the interna-
tional system of information exchange limits its inquiry to transna-
tional transport of computer generated and machine readable digi-
tal data via electronic transmission. This definition includes voice,
image, characters, and other symbols transported by satellite, mi-
crowave, cable, or conventional radio in a converged digital bit
streams that does not discriminate between types of communica-
28. Feldman and Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 N.C.J.
INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 1, 1 (1982).
29. Digital Technology represents all the information that occurs in a process in dis-
crete integral numbers. C. Sn'PL, DATA COMMUNICArlONs DicrboNARY 132 (1976). In elec-
tronic operations, the most practical application of available devices results from the use of
the binary number system that allows only the digits 0 and 1. Id. at 28. A single character in
a binary number is a bit. Id. at 29. Thus, the expression of data for transmission by a
satellite system appears as a stream of bits. Id. For a discussion of recent developments in
digital communication see INSTrrUrION oF ELEcTRICAL ENGINEERS, TELECOMMUNICATION
TRANSMISSION-INTO THE DIGrrAL ERA (1981).
30. Packet switching is only one kind of network. The basic functions of a computer
are storage, transmission, retrieval, manipulation, and control. Computers facilitate the
992 [Vol. 36:985
GLOBAL NETWORKS
tions services. These delivery systems now are called integrated
services digital networks (ISDNs) 1 The last part of the Article
3 2
examines the legal environment in which these networks currently
are developing.
C. A Taxonomy of Information
In addition to the problem of definition, another difficulty in
understanding the issues related to transborder data flow is that
the information in transit is not all of equal value. For example,
yesterday's news is not worth much on the information market,
but financial information about potential mergers or acquisitions
may have great value to persons who discover the facts first. That
sixteenth century Augsburg bankers published the first European
newspaper was no accident."
A huge variety of information is available for distribution.
Governments spend mammoth amounts of money to keep secure
some information, such as the technical specifications of nuclear
weapons.3 ' Public and private groups, in contrast, seek to dissemi-
nate without charge information concerning, for example, health
care aid to pregnant women in developing countries. Profit-seeking
enterprises distribute a wide variety of other types of information.
For example, an active international marketplace now exists for
scientific and technical information as well as for entertainment
and news products. Licensing of United States patents is as active
as the marketing of its manufactured goods, and the international
market for American movies, television programs, books, and
magazines is quite strong. Publishers of Reader's Digest distribute
the magazine throughout the world in many languages; Dow Jones
now publishes a Hong Kong edition of the Wall Street Journal
transmission of users' communications by receiving the messages, converting them to digital
bit streams; separating the bit streams into packets; and controlling the transmission of
these packets in microsecond bursts on a channel of the communications system. This
method allows the communication channel to accommodate the transmission of many
messages from multiple users simultaneously simply by coordinating the flow of the packets.
For a discussion of packet switching concepts, see PROTOCOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DATA
COMMUNICATION NETwORKS (F. Kuo ed. 1981).
31. See generally V. BHARGAvA, D. HACCOUN, R. MATYAS, & P. NUSPL, DIGrrAL COMMU-
NICATIONS BY SATELLITE: MODULATION, MULTIPLE ACCESS AND CODING 229-268 (1981) (discus-
sion of integrated systems that operate on time-division multiple access technology).
32. See infra notes 236-60 and accompanying text.
33. See notes Hamelink, Banks' Control and Use of Information, 5 TRANSNAT'L DATA
REP., No. 1, 1982, at 21.
34. For a discussion of United States government restrictions on the flow of scientific
and technical data, see infra text accompanying notes 120-40.
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directly by satellite. Time magazine is available in 191 countries.
Viewers throughout the world watch Hollywood movies, and Amer-
ican television programs are as well known in foreign capitals as
Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and American Express.
Clearly, a taxonomy of information is necessary to sort out the
legal issues that arise from information flows across national bor-
ders. The legal environment in which the "hot line" between the
Kremlin and the White House operates is very different from the
one in which a hurricane alert system works. To avoid catching
information in which a high priority exists for flow without legal
constraints in the same legal net designed to control information in
which nation states have a legitimate interest, one must examine
separately the legal environment of each type of information flow.
The taxonomy in this Article includes at least eleven types of in-
formation: (1) personal; (2) political; (3) scientific and technical;
(4) strategic and military; (5) health, safety, and environmental; (6)
economic; (7) financial; (8) management; (9) educational; (10) reli-
gious and moral; (11) news and entertainment.
II. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION TRANSPORT BY ELECTRONIC MEANS
Territorial imperative and natural geographical boundaries in-
hibited the transport of information in primitive societies. Never-
theless, a system of respect developed early for the personal integ-
rity of the messenger bringing information from other cultures or
tribes. Although some Greek rulers reportedly cut out the tongues
of messengers bearing bad tidings, this policy was self-defeating,
because it stifled the flow of reliable information that rulers could
use to make decisions rationally. From this background, the tradi-
tion has developed that personal representatives of nation states
possess an immunity from the application of local laws.3 5 Messen-
gers physically transporting information through the territories of
other nation states may travel unmolested unless a host nation
shows that the messengers are violating the trust that the state has
granted by using their presence to promote activities inimical to
the interests of the host nation. 6 Oswald Ganley has pointed out:
35. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Apr. 18, 1961, arts. XXVII, XXIX, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 3239, 3240; 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 108, 110.
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(3), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978;
see also Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951 (2.5) (1980) (Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act and Executive Order govern electronic surveillance policy).
994 [Vol. 36:985
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Information has always traveled by the fastest or most convenient means for
communicating it, whether that be by speaking, yelling, smoke signaling,
beating drums, sending a runner with a message, entrusting a note to a pack-
etboat or the pony express or a carrier pigeon, posting or flashing lights, writ-
ing, printing and distributing books, newspapers, and magazines, or making
use of the postal system.
Whether the information was spoken, or handwritten, or printed with
ink, or recorded on wax, film, or magnetic tape, the purpose has always been
the same: To take whatever information was available and convey it to some-
one for social, informative, entertainment, educational, financial, commercial,
political, or military ends. In this sense, nothing has ever changed. 7
The immediacy, bulk, and complexity of the information that
modern "messengers" can carry across national boundaries by
cable or satellite interconnected data networks has changed, how-
ever. A substantial body of international law has developed con-
cerning the transport of information in written documents through
the mails. The earliest governmental response, the Universal
Postal Union, began in 1878 to negotiate and develop acceptable
protocols for the posts."5 Agreements promulgated bilaterally and
through the efforts of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion have protected proprietary rights in published works.39 This
Article, however, restricts its review to international and intergov-
ernmental efforts that concern transport of information by elec-
tronic means.
An international legal system for electronic transport of infor-
mation grew out of the frustration of telegraph operators having to
hand carry telegraphic messages from a telegraph terminal in one
country across the border to a telegraph terminal in a neighboring
country. This arrangement could result in distortion, loss, or inter-
ception of the messages. Frustration and the widespread awareness
that the technology was available to deliver messages from source
to user without this delay resulted in the creation of the Interna-
tional Telegraph Union in Paris in 1865. The treaty that estab-
lished the Union granted participating nations the right to corre-
spond by telegraph, provided for protection of the secrecy of the
transmissions, and established uniformity in tariffs and regula-
tions.40 Article 2 of the treaty, however, reserved the right of na-
37. G. GANLEY & 0. GANLEY, THE U.S. AND ITS COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION RE-
SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 15 (Program on Information Resources Policy) (1980).
38. The UPU originated under provisions of the Treaty of Bern of 1875 and operated
under the Universal Copyright Convention signed by the United States on September 16,
1955.
39. The World Intellectual Property Organization began under a Convention that 51
countries signed in Stockholm in 1967 and that now includes 88 nations.
40. International Telegraph Convention of Paris, May 17, 1865, 9 Recueil de Trait~s
9951983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tion states to stop any telegram that they considered dangerous to
national security or contrary to the law, public order, or good
morals of the receiving country.41 Although the United States no
longer recognizes this mandate for state censorship, the provision
remains part of the Union's regulations. 2 After plenipotentiary
meetings that all signatory nations attended in Paris in 1865, Vi-
enna in 1868, Rome in 1871-72, and Saint Petersburg in 1875, the
advent of the telephone in 1876 prompted the International Tele-
graph Union to add another "T" to its name and become known as
the International Telegraph and Telephone Union.
A separate organization developed in 1903 to regulate the use
of radio technology.43 This negotiating body was a response to the
monopolistic practices of the Marconi Wireless Company. Marconi
negotiated contracts to install equipment only in ocean-going ves-
sels that agreed to refuse to communicate with vessels that Mar-
coni had not equipped." Concern that this antitrust practice might
endanger the safety of maritime transportation prompted interna-
tional cooperation to establish safety regulations. Coastal and ship
stations thereafter "bound [themselves] to exchange wireless tele-
grams reciprocally without distinction of the wireless telegraph
system adopted by such stations. '4 5 Signatory nations could re-
serve the right to ignore this requirement provided one or more
coastal stations in their territory remained subject to the obliga-
tion. Eighteen of the twenty-seven nations signing the treaty did
not make any reservations and twenty-one countries signed com-
pulsory interconnection agreements for ship-to-ship transmissions.
Compulsory obligation to install radio transmitters and receivers
followed shortly after the disastrous sinking of the Titanic, in
which many passengers might not have lost their lives if vessels in
the vicinity had been listening to their radios.46
(France) 254.
41. 56 British and Foreign State Papers 294; see Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of
the International Telecommunications Union Through Time and in Space, 60 MxCH. L.
REv. 269, 272 n.12 (1962).
42. Article 85, Final Protocol to the Telegraph Regulations, Nov. 29, 1958, 10 U.S.T.
2611, 2613 & 2995, T.I.A.S. No. 4390.
43. An international convention established the International Radiotelegraph Union in
1906. Berlin Radiotelegraph Convention, Nov. 3, 1906, 37 Stat. 1565, T.S. No. 568. The
organization remained in existence until 1932, when the newly born International Telecom-
munications Union absorbed its functions. Glazer, supra note 41, at 274-79; see infra text
accompanying notes 47-48.
44. Glazer, supra note 41, at 274.




By 1932 nations began to realize the advantages of merging
radio, telephone, and telegraph functions into a single agency, and
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) emerged. In
1947 the ITU became a part of the United Nations.47 The ITU
essentially is a cooperative venture among nations that provides a
forum for negotiating agreements which facilitate the flow of infor-
mation across national borders by electronic means. The ITU also
serves as an administrative means for identifying and recording
users, their frequencies, and their purposes. Perhaps the organiza-
tion's major contribution is in the development of international
technical standards through which technicians can interconnect
different operating systems into a global network.4"
The ITU primarily has been a forum for participants from
technical backgrounds to address the resolution of technical issues.
Lawyers and politicians rarely have made appearances in the many
conferences and consultative committees through which the ITU
functions. The United States' sixty-seven member delegation to
the World Administrative Conference in 1979 included only two
lawyers and the only participant there with sufficient political
skills to function effectively in an international political arena had
responsibilities to numerous other agencies. 49 Increasingly, how-
ever, the decisions that the technical representatives make have
political and legal consequences of great significance. Political con-
siderations more often motivate the requests of member nations as
the third world countries seek greater access to the global commu-
nications systems. Concerns over access are part and parcel of the
larger effort of third-world nations to establish a new economic or-
der and a more balanced distribution of the world's resources.8 0
The third world is waging this effort in the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, in UNESCO, and in the ITU.5 1
47. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 2, 1947, 63 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S.
No. 1901, 30 U.N.T.S. 316. See generally CODDMING, JR. & A. RuTKowsiu, THE INTERNATIONAL
TLECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD (1982) (thorough survey of ITU's history,
present structure and functions, and prospects for the future); D. Lmsv, INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM
(1970) (analysis of how nations apportion the communications spectrum).
48. J. BROWN & E. BLAZIER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 235 (1974); J. MARTIN, TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS AND THE ComPuTER 39 (2d ed. 1976). The most recent examples relevant to TDF
are the X.25 interface standards for packet switched networks and the efforts to produce an
international standard for videotex services.
49. This person was the Deputy Chief of the United States Mission to the European
Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations.
50. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 at 40 (1974).
51. See infra note 246. See generally S. MacBride, Many Voices, One World: Toward
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In the ITU context the struggle has meant a rejection of the
"first come, first served" principles under which nation states
merely initiated services and recorded them for all to see within
the International Frequency Registration Board. Developing na-
tions are applying increasing pressure to allocate frequencies ac-
cording to equitable formulae, and two of the three world regions
already have allocated geostationary orbits for direct broadcast
satellites. The United States forestalled the planning exercise for
satellite allocation for the North and South American region 2 un-
til 1983 in the hope that it could circumvent the exercise. The
United States also claimed that a priori planning would result in
inefficient use of the spectrum.2 However inefficient early alloca-
tion may be, the third world nations-which wield substantial
power in the ITU because of the principle of majority rule5A-may
find this planning an expedient way to obtain control over re-
sources of economic value. Third world governments might then
lease or negotiate away these information resources for technology
transfer or capital investment in their own telecommunications
infrastructure.
The ITU continues to work because it must; without it, global
electronic communication could not function. Participation is com-
pletely voluntary; the organization has no sanctions to enforce
compliance and no mandate to develop operational services. In-
deed, the ITU may not have sufficient resources to do more than
set the agenda for training and consulting services for developing
countries, although the organization has undertaken a very ambi-
tious project in its World Year of Communications: Development
of Communications Infrastructures" focusing the world's attention
upon the necessity of providing these advisory services to all na-
tions. Upon taking office the new Secretary General of the ITU
called the world telecommunications network "the largest machine
in the world. . . a marvel of the century. . . [including] 550 mil-
lion telephones, 560 million television receivers, 1.4 million telex
terminals, thousands of data networks and other special-purpose
a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order (1980)
(Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems).
52. The electromagnetic spectrum is a continuous range of frequencies "from the long-
est known electrical wave to the shortest cosmic ray." C. SrPPL, supra note 29, at 451. A
chart showing the breakdown of the electromnagnetic spectrum by frequency and wave-
length appears at R. BONES, DICTIONARY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 194 (1970).
53. Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L.
1, 34-35 (1980).
54. Address by R. E. Butler, supra note 11.
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transmission systems.55 Yet ninety percent of these installations
serve only fifteen percent of the world's nations. Secretary General
Butler has made it his goal to see that the ITU becomes a tool for
expanding the global network to include more of the underserved:
Communication is an inexhaustible resource, an ever-growing technology
which can greatly enhance the use of all the earth's resources, natural, human
and economic.... [t]he harmonious and well-balanced development of an
ever-closer-knit world communications network is a major historical event in
keeping with the emergence of a collective awareness among mankind as a
whole.... [n]o-one any longer should be isolated from the national or inter-
national community. Communications should be a right and not a privilege.56
Secretary General Butler's statement is more a political tactic
than a legal argument, although a growing sentiment exists that
the right "to seek, receive, and impart information" contained in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights57 should become more
than a mere exhortation to the world's conscience.58 To turn the
ITU's essentially neutral forum into a politically charged battle-
ground for the determination of power structures or the develop-
ment of legal principles likely would jeopardize its value as a de-
vice for formulating the technical standards upon which the very
existence of the global network now rests. Thus, partisans who
tamper with the ITU or press upon it substantial new responsibili-
ties do so at their peril. Technical innovations in themselves are
beginning to overwhelm the capacity of the present bureaucracy;
the increasing number of special conferences scheduled for the
next few years and the decreasing time between world administra-
tive conferences are evidence of this problem."
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. G.A. Res. 217 art. XIX, 3 GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948).
58. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court
held that
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally ac-
cepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of
the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an
alien within our borders, § 1350 [of the Judiciary Act of 1789] provides federal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 878.
59. For example, the ITU will be holding conferences over the next several years on
high frequency radio bands (1984 and 1986), the uses of geostationary satellite orbits, and
the planning of space services (1985 and 1987). See Robinson, supra note 53, at 52-53. For a
complete list of scheduled conferences see NTIA Report, supra note 36, at 56-59.
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III. THE GLOBAL SATELLITE SYSTEM FOR INFORMATION
TRANSPORT-INTELSAT
The international satellite system known as INTELSAT is a
major component in the international infrastructure for trans-
border data flow. INTELSAT provides a common carrier service to
170 nations; its transponders 0 transmit two-thirds of all interna-
tional message traffic and virtually all live transborder television.
The system's primary use is to transmit telephone traffic. INTEL-
SAT is an intergovernmental agency with 108 participating mem-
ber nations, second only in size to the international organization
ITU, which has a membership of 154.1 Treaties, conventions, or
executive agreements govern the relationship between the partici-
pating members.2 INTELSAT was the godchild of COMSAT, an
organization set up under the Communications Satellite Act of
196263 to build a global satellite system. The global system has
grown from eleven original participating member nations in 1964,
whose use of world telephones constituted eighty-five percent of all
telephone traffic. Long the leader and largest investor of the sys-
tem, COMSAT now only has twenty-three percent ownership in
INTELSAT.4
Satellite service INTELSAT has grown at a twenty-five per-
cent per annum rate from 240 telephone circuits in 1964 to 60,000
today. 5 The price of leasing a full circuit has dropped from
$64,000 to $9,360 per annum.6 Today, the top users include newly
industrialized countries like Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Ara-
bia, the Oil Emirates, and the member nations of the Organization
60. "The equipment which receives a signal, amplifies it, changes its frequency, and
retransmits it is called a transponder." J. MARTIN, supra note 48, at 281 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Communication satellites typically contain several transponders. Id.; see also R. GA-
LIARDI, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING 127-31 (1978) (technical aspects of
transponder system).
61. Because of an influx of members from the less developed countries, the ITU re-
cently has grown from a relatively small organization of deveioped nations into the world's
largest international organizations. See Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio
Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 293 (1979).
62. See generally J. Pelton, M. Perras & A. Sinha, INTELSAT, The Global Telecom-
munications Network (materials distributed at Pacific Telecommunications Conference,
Jan. 16-19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Conference] (structure, functions, and
future of INTELSAT).
63. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1976).
64. INTELSAT 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1981).
65. Ahern & Greenberg, Communications Satellites, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE
U.S.: TRENDS AND POLICIES 85, 86-87 (L. Lewin ed. 1981).
66. INTELSAT Conference, supra note 62, at 16, 21.
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).8 Although
the heaviest use and financial support still comes from the devel-
oped nations, the vast majority of participants are developing
countries.
The global satellite system has revolutionized the flow of com-
munications traffic. Before the system, communications traffic
traveled internationally by point-to-point cable facilities;68 under-
sea cables interconnected only the wealthiest, most developed
countries. Cables are not obsolete because they provide reliability,
redundancy, and security of transmission. The satellite service,
however, provides multipoint rather than point-to-point transmis-
sion services. Since the system is distance and volume insensitive,
small users do not suffer a penalty of higher tariffs,6 9 and large and
powerful nation users have no inherent advantage over the smaller
and economically less developed countries.
Each country maintains its own national system and controls
its own interconnection to the global system. Furthermore, a sover-
eign state may curtail only its own access to the system. Thus, IN-
TELSAT is an independent, accessible global network open to all
nations that choose to participate. Participants are not subject to
the disruption of service at the whim of individual nations, unless,
of course, a nation chooses to shoot down the satellite.70 While the
system is vulnerable to the few states that currently have the ca-
pacity to destroy satellites in orbit, the political consequences of
such an action make it unacceptable public policy for any nation
67. The OECD, established in 1961, promotes the economic and social welfare of its
member states. Members in 1982 included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 587 (1983).
68. Point-to-point communication facilities pass information incrementally from one
station to the next. J. MATIN, supra note 48, at 412. Thus, to send a communication from
location A to D requires transmitting the message from A to B, from B to C, and then from
C to D. With a multipoint network-like a satellite system-the A to D communication is
accomplished with a single transmission.
69. With fiber optical cables the high speed and fidelity that data communications
require may be available equally via land and sea.
70. M. Goldey, Aspects of International Voice Communications to and from the
United States, A Working Paper of the American Bar Association Section on Science and
Technology Project on International Data Networks Project 32 (to be published in
Juaimmcs J.). Reportedly, the State Department held discussions during the Iranian hos-
tage crisis concerning methods of withholding television service from Iran to the United
States. See Broad, No Go for Satellite Sanctions Against Iran-A Presidential Proposal to





Commentators have described INTELSAT as the most suc-
cessful international organization and as an international organiza-
tion that actually works.7 1 The system, however, has not escaped
criticism. Some of the less developed countries and less affluent
users in developed countries have claimed that INTELSAT's low-
powered, high orbit satellites require expensive, high-powered sat-
ellite saucers to gain access to the system, and thus exclude the
poorer users. The Public Interest Satellite Association7 2 in the
United States has lobbied successfully for allocation of frequencies
that could accommodate lower powered, low cost saucers.73 Yash
Pal, Secretary General of the Unispace Conference and former Di-
rector of the Indian Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
(SITE), has urged a system of lower powered orbiting satellites,
which might better suit the financial capabilities and informational
needs of the developing nations.
7 4
INTELSAT is responding to the criticisms of developing and
less affluent users by establishing a "low-density telephony ser-
vice" designed particularly to meet the needs of the Pacific Island
nations. 7 5 The organization also has planned new business services
to provide small, lower cost ground terminals for public and corpo-
rate users. These terminals will utilize five to eight meter earth
stations installed at the users' places of business rather than large
feeder satellite antennae that presently interconnect to the public
71. See INTELSAT Conference, supra note 62, at 8.
72. The Public Interest Satellite Ass'n (PISA) is a public interest group whose func-
tion is to conduct research on the use of satellites for public purposes and to lobby for
legislation favoring use of satellite technology to benefit the largest possible number of
people.
73. A. Horowitz & W. Thomas, The Unexplored Option: Critical Choices For Public
Telecommunications, 1977-2000 (1977) (working paper prepared under the auspices of the
Public Interest Satellite Association); W. McGraw, Toward the Public Dividend (1977) (re-
port commissioned by the Public Interest Satellite Association). For a discussion of the ne-
gotiations and claims of various national delegations concerning space options, see generally
Robinson, supra note 53, at 18-28.
74. Address upon the occasion of the award of the International Marconi Fellowship,
The Hague (June 12, 1982); see HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2d SEss.,
REPORT ON THE SECOND U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (UNIS-
PACE 1982) 9 (Comm. Print 1983). The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) organized Unispace '82 to review the state of space science and determine
ways of improving its use through international cooperation. Id. at 1.
SITE was an experimental project in India for distribution of satellite signals on educa-
tional topics to remote villages. The project employed the American NASA satellite ATS-1.
75. INTELSAT Conference, supra note 62, at 39; see Address by Koji Imakita, Third
Annual Pacific Telecommunications Council Seminar (June 7, 1982) (discussing how re-
gional satellite communications should be arranged in terms of Pacific telecommunications).
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networks. INTELSAT does not intend to allow potential competi-
tors to overwhelm it; "eventually all communication services can
be provided by INTELSAT in the framework of the global inte-
grated services network.1
7
Thus, INTELSAT sees itself as a major-if not the
sole-supplier of transnational information transport by satellite,
and it is moving rapidly to meet the changing needs of users at
both the high end and low end of the financial spectrum. The sys-
tem is organizing to provide new telecommunications services, such
as video conferencing; aeronautical, maritime, and land mobile ser-
vices; business data; and possibly remote sensing data and direct
broadcasting.7" Nonetheless, INTELSAT recognizes that no inter-
national monopoly could or does exist, as long as alternative chan-
nels of communication via surface mail, undersea cables, or radio
broadcasting continue to be viable.
The very existence of the INTELSAT system has facilitated
greatly the transfer of information across international boundaries
and proliferated the transfer of voice, video, and data communica-
tions. By 1986 INTELSAT expects to have satellites in orbit that
are capable of transmitting the entire contents of the Encyclopedia
Britannica or its equivalent across the face of the globe twenty
times every minute, for the equivalent of 28,000 Encyclopedia
Britannicas a day.7 8 Clearly, the system provides a critical part of
the infrastructure for transborder data flow.
IV. GLOBAL NETWORKS OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW
A number of systems have developed for international ex-
change of a tremendous variety of data. Some of these systems
make use of INTELSAT as their means of transmission; others
utilize cables and more traditional means. A review of several of
these systems illustrates the wide range of data types that flow
through global networks. An analysis of the legal issues concerning
transborder data flow requires an awareness of the environment in
which each of these global networks functions.
76. INTELSAT Conference, supra note 62.
77. These goals for expanded service are consistent with INTELSAT's primary objec-
tive of "efficient provision, technologically and economically, of world-wide satellite commu-
nications." Snow, INTELSAT An International Example, 30 J. CoM. 147, 155 (1980).




One of the earliest recognized needs for satellite communica-
tions was for navigation. Maritime Satellite Communications
(MARISAT) is a service that COMSAT General Corporation of
Washington, D.C., originated in 1976."' Three satellites"0 provide
links to ships at sea with interactive communications capability to
computer networks and data bases. Not only does MARISAT meet
navigational needs by satellite, but also seamen may make tele-
phone calls. Ships may send telex transmissions and establish link-
ups with personal data bases; these data bases include computer
games, electronic mail, and educational routines. Jacques Cous-
teau's famous research vessel Calypso has had access to MARISAT
for over eighteen months and reports that both scientific and per-
sonal contracts have been greatly facilitated: "[I]t has changed our
life on board ship."'81
Today INMARSAT has taken over the three MARISAT satel-
lites and also is leasing transponder space from INTELSAT. IN-
MARSAT has thirty-seven member countries. The United States,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Japan hold
the largest investment shares in the organization.2 Olof Lundberg,
Director General of the new system of INMARSAT, described its
value and potential as follows:
Inmarsat services mean that ships can be as easy to reach as offices on shore,
and this can have a dramatic impact on the way they are managed, as well as
on the quality of life enjoyed by ship's crews, and, most important of all,
safety of life and property.... The potential for growth of mobile satellite
communications is enormous. The world's merchant fleet consists of over
70,000 ships. The number at present fitted for satellite communications is
about 1,000."
79. The members of the MARISAT Joint Venture include COMSAT General Corp.,
RCA Global Communications, Inc., Western Union International, Inc., and ITT World
Communications, Inc. Martin & Lipke, Performance of the MARISAT Communications
System, in MARITIME AND AERONAUTICAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION 1, 2
(1978).
80. For technical information about the three MARISAT satellites (named MARECS,
MARISAT, and MAROTS), see COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNICATION AND BROADCAST SATEL-
LITES: 1958 TO 1980, at 47-58 (M. Brown ed. 1981).
81. On Line (in orbit) with MARISAT, SOURCEWORLD, at 5.






Not surprisingly, the banking industry has been most active in
developing transborder data links. Indeed, in one of the earliest air
travel data linkups, a Rothschild banker organized a private carrier
pigeon service, which enabled him to obtain a competitive advan-
tage in marketing securities through access to information about
the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo."' The reasons for the banking
industry's interest in transborder data flow are apparent. Because
banking is a system of mediation between borrowers and lenders of
money, it is an information industry in which money itself is infor-
mation, and the information content of all money transactions is
high. The success or failure of a banking transaction depends
largely upon the parties' knowledge about the political and eco-
nomic environments in which the lending transactions take place.
Thus, financial data carries considerable market value, and its suc-
cessful use depends upon the speed and accuracy with which bank-
ers can deliver it.
Most major banks now have worldwide networks for their own
internal use and are interconnected through a special dedicated
network."5 Huge amounts of financial information still cross na-
tional boundaries by post, telex, and telephone, but increasingly,
banking institutions transfer raw data in machine readable form in
a stream of electronic signals recognizable only by a computer.
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company has been
one of the leaders in establishing international data links. As early
as 1980 Continental's European branches were transmitting com-
puterized transactions data over leased lines to a central processing
unit installed in Chicago. The branches were providing customers
worldwide with their daily banking needs through a computer in
the United States.
86
Citibank's GLOBECOM, a network of leased lines that reach
overseas branches in over 100 countries, is typical of today's bank-
ing networks. The GLOBECOM system passes more than 300,000
transmissions per month through computer switches in London,
Bahrain, Hong Kong, and New York. Chase Manhattan Bank's
84. Hamelink, supra note 33, at 21.
85. A dedicated network of this nature combines several specific communication cir-
cuits allocated solely to the specific bank's transmissions. C. SIPPL, supra note 29, at 123.
86. International Data Flow: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Infor-
mation and Individual Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 112-139 (1980) (statement of Robert E. L. Walker, Vice President and Associate
Corporate Council, Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.).
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private communications network reaches out from a cable and
wireless computer in Hong Kong and an RCA computer in New
York to branches in Piraeus, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, and other
parts of the globe. Indeed, a global system of monetary exchange
operates twenty-four hours a day.87 Bankers perceive the efforts to
inhibit the flow of information internationally as inimical to their
business interests. Large international institutions in particular
fear that measures which governments intend to limit transfer of
other types of information will have a restrictive impact upon
banking networks as well. According to a Citibank executive:
Since the digital information flowing in cables or moving through space will
be, in effect, a single, homogeneous stream, it will become increasingly impos-
sible to maintain any of the traditional distinctions between transmissions
carrying news, entertainment, financial data or even personal phone calls.
This intermixing of data will make it impossible to pass laws restricting the
transmission of one kind of information without impinging on all the others.
Efforts to impede the flow of capital must inevitably lead to restrictions im-
posed on the flow of information and vice versa.88
In contrast, governing elites fear that the international move-
ment of financial data will make it easier for banks and other in-
ternational business institutions to escape the application of na-
tional laws regulating and taxing money transactions because these
organizations will be able to manipulate electronically the situs of
their funds. This fear has some validity. Banking institutions have
threatened the very existence of the national money markets in
their efforts to control national currencies in the same interna-
tional trade transactions that gave rise to the Eurodollar.", Experts
have estimated that approximately one trillion dollars have found
refuge in a stateless pool of investment capital of "supermoney." 0
Although transborder data flow has contributed to interna-
tional trade, some critics believe that the use of new technology
information transfer increases financial instability by disrupting
the influence of nation states, either individually or collectively,
over the international monetary system. 1 Thus, critics see an al-
teration of the balance of power not only between international
financial institutions and their national governments, but also be-
87. Hamelink, supra note 33, at 24-25.
88. W. Sparks, Address at the Annenberg School of Communications Conference on
World Communications (May 1980), cited in Hamelink, supra note 33, at 25-26.





tween small and large banking institutions.2 As larger institutions
gain the ability to install sophisticated computerized information
systems, they will obtain a competitive advantage over smaller
banks that cannot make transfers as easily. Moreover, large insti-
tutions, which have access to an international information market
when they deliver ancillary financial data and services-such as
Chase Manhattan's economic data and econometric modeling ser-
vices, which estimates show grossed $2.5 billion in 1978 and are
growing at a thirty percent annual rate9" have an advantage over
smaller banks.
Thus, banking rapidly is becoming globalized. Two interna-
tional financial data systems reportedly are interconnecting their
services: CIDEL, which links fifty-one countries from headquarters
in Luxembourg and handles stock transactions, and SWIFT, which
links twenty-one countries from headquarters in Belgium and han-
dles interbank transactions. Visa International president Dee Hock
has warned bankers that events will overwhelm them if they re-
main rooted in past practices, because in the future banking insti-
tutions will deliver their services to customers wherever the cus-
tomers happen to be.9
C. Resources Management
Remote sensing of the earth is another area in which the avail-
ability by satellite of computerized data about a nation outside its
territorial boundaries causes concern to policymakers. For some
years the nation states that lead the world in space technology
commonly have been known to operate spy satellites. But this type
of practice is acceptable and only disturbs ruling elites when it be-
comes public, for example, when the pilot of the American U-2 spy
plane crashed over Soviet territory.95 Nevertheless, some theoreti-
cal ferment has developed over whether these observational craft
are violating airspace and whether the satellites are operating with
the peaceful purposes that the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, In-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, requires.9 6 Some
92. Id. at 26-27.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Visa Warns Bankers Over New Technology, 5 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. 28 (1982).
95. For a contemporary discussion of the U-2 incident and its international implica-
tions, see Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836 (1960).
96. Outer Space Treaty, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
10071983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
commentators argue that strategic reconnaissance should not be
permissible except by the consent of the photographed country."
Arguably, however, the maintenance of a system of nuclear stale-
mate contributes to the "benefit and [is] in the interests of all
countries" and nations should encourage it as long as the satellite
photography causes no detriment to the photographed country.
Technologically, most countries could not possibly exert national
control over the space that extends above their territorial bounda-
ries. The ability to control this space, however, one day might lead
to greater wealth if space explorers are able to mine the resources
of planets light years away. Hence, the notion of control by nation
states over space may have a certain attraction in the long term.
The most controversial type of data recovery by satellite has
been remote sensing of the earth's resources. LANDSAT 1, which
the United States launched in July 1972, LANDSAT 2, launched
in January 1975, and LANDSAT 3, launched in March 1978, orbit
the globe about 575 miles above the earth and carefully scrutinize
the planet in sections about 100 nautical miles wide. Photographs
that LANDSAT cameras obtain can identify objects less than 100
yards in size. Within an eighteen day period the satellite can map
the entire face of the globe-a rather startling economy compared
with the years that Captain Cook spent mapping the Pacific Is-
lands. In addition to gathering data extremely rapidly, LANDSAT
produces accurate information and can prove, for example, that
maps of the Amazon River were miles off course in the jungle areas
of Brazil. Moreover, image processing through a computerized sys-
tem of color correlation permits careful differentiation of certain
features from others.
The speed, accuracy, and detail of the LANDSAT data pro-
duction has suited it to many purposes. Users of the system can
estimate crop acreage of wheat fields in the United States to an
accuracy of ninety-five percent. The system has facilitated regional
planning in the Phillipines by producing images of the Manila
metropolitan area from 1972 to 1976 for comparison. A fifty-four
percent increase in residential construction and a corresponding
decrease of eighty-five percent in forested areas provides dramatic
confirmation of the rapid urbanization of the Phillipines. In Paki-
stan the government used LANDSAT data to select promising
97. See, e.g., D. Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Imple-




sites for copper exploration. LANDSAT has improved greatly
water resources management by allowing experts to monitor the
monsoon rains to anticipate and thus diminish their adverse
consequences. 8
LANDSAT transmits the raw data it has gathered to the
Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Data Center, which
the United States Geological Survey operates at Sioux Falls, South
Dakota.99 EROS processes the remote data and makes it available
to purchasers all over the world at prices based upon reproduction
costs. Although the prices of processed LANDSAT information are
not negligible, they are modest compared to the research and de-
velopment costs for the system itself, which developed as an off-
shoot of the United States investment in space technology. 100 The
Reagan administration already has announced its intention to turn
the processing of LANDSAT data over to the private sector.101 The
current market for LANDSAT products is quite small, however,
about six million dollars annually, whereas estimates of the cost of
operating the system range from one to ten billion dollars over a
ten year period. 102 Although the American private sector would
find such profit prospects unattractive, the French government has
moved toward launching its own remote sensing satellite in 1984.103
Some nations have developed their own capability to receive
and process the information directly from the LANDSAT satellite
without the help of EROS. For example, the Brazilian Institute de
Pesquisas Espaciais possesses its own processing unit. This unit
has issued reports on oceanographic data, forestry and agronomy
data, geographic data (including soil use, urbanism, and environ-
mental impact), and geological data.
10 4
Not all nations have been equally eager to use the EROS data,
and many governments have questioned whether any nation has a
legal right to sense via satellite the territorial area of a sovereign
98. Umali, Landsat: Uninvited Eye, EAsT-WEsT PERSP., Winter 1980, at 12, 13.
99. Waldrop, Imaging the Earth (II): The Politics of Landsat, 216 SCIENCE 40, 41
(1982). For a discussion of the data collected by EROS and its uses, see Bylinsky, EROS
Puts the Whole Earth Under a Microscope, FORTUNE, Feb. 1975, at 117.
100. The annual expenditure of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration is
approximately $25 billion; the cost of a single map from EROS is about $45. According to a
recent estimate, EROS could derive about $6 million in income annually. Waldrop, supra
note 99, at 40.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id. at 40.
103. Id. at 41.
104. Letter from Ren6 Antonio Novaes, Head, Remote Sensing Department of the
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnol6gico, to author (Nov. 24, 1981).
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nation without its consent. Technically, a nation state would have
difficulty prohibiting the space photography of its land mass be-
cause the technologically capable states merely could ignore a na-
tion's legal restriction. Switching the satellite's camera lenses on
and off at the request of the states below would be difficult, espe-
cially in areas where the nations are in close proximity. Further-
more, the sensing itself is harmless; the use to which the data is
put creates the problems.
Nation states that are technologically unable to process
LANDSAT data or financially unable to buy EROS information
have been especially critical of the system because they believe it
disadvantages them. Many third world nations feel unprepared to
compete with the activities of nonnational business organizations
that seek to develop natural resources or buy crops of these coun-
tries. Outsiders with access to EROS data may know more about
the third world nations than the nations do themselves. Indeed, in
early negotiations only Brazil claimed to require the consent of the
state that the satellite sensed prior to photographing. 1 5 Even more
controversial is the right of the sensed state to obtain the informa-
tion related to its land mass or to require prior consent to dissemi-
nation of the data to third parties."0 6 Whether a sensed nation can
or should control the sensing, clearly it has an undeniable right
under international law and traditional concepts of territorial sov-
ereignty to control the natural resources found within its territorial
jurisdiction. 0 7 The USSR claims that nation states have an ina-
lienable right to control both their own natural resources and in-
formation concerning such resources."0 8 The Japanese, however,
have taken the position that remote sensing is not equivalent to
taking the natural resources of another nation.09
The United States, which practices what it preaches on the
issue of the right of sensed nations to control the flow of informa-
tion about their territories, has made the data that it has collected
from LANDSAT equally available to all nations. Without the abil-
105. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/122 at para. 3 (1974). See generally Comment, Earth Re-
source Satellites, a Puzzle for the United Nations, 16 HARv. INT'L L. J. 648 (1975) (legal
problems concerning sovereignty).
106. Umai, supra note 98, at 16.
107. Comment, supra note 105, at 650.
108. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L. 88, at paras. 4-5 (1973).
109. Umali, supra note 98, at 16. "The United Kingdom and a number of other West
European nations agree with the U.S. and Japan, while the East European countries have
joined the U.S.S.R. in pressing for restrictive measures." Id. at 17.
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ity to analyze the data, however, access is not equal.110 Many na-
tions increasingly are becoming sensitive to the vulnerability that
their dependence upon foreign sources for information about their
own resources creates. If these nations permit their economies to
become dependent upon satellite imagery, they may question the
wisdom of permitting the service to remain indefinitely under the
control of a single nation-the United States."' In the current
American setting of budget cuts, however, increased United States
investment in remote sensing is unlikely to aim at assisting devel-
oping countries to develop their own processing technology.
The continuing investment of developed nations in their own
domestic satellites doubtless will cause the legal questions about
remote sensing (RMS) to proliferate as more countries become ca-
pable of receiving and processing satellite images. The historical
practice of the United States has been to transfer governmentally
developed research capability to the private sector when the activ-
ity has become economically viable. The resolution of legal uncer-
tainties, however, is necessary before private investors will commit
their capital to developing the potential of RMS data for all users
around the globe, both public and private."
2
Some regional or global system of RMS data management and
collection might be a solution to the legal problems that arise in
this area. Surprisingly, approximately 120 nations, two-thirds of
which are from the developing world, are investing substantial
sums of money to develop computerized capability to utilize RMS
data with little concern over the legal threat to the right to receive
the data from its source-a United States controlled, NASA
launched satellite system. Apprehension about the consequences,
however, may be the source of a suggestion by a committee of the
National Research Council that the American government should
"declare soon that remote sensing systems constitute in effect an
international public utility destined for international
governance."'13
110. Comment, supra note 105, at 654.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Comment, supra note 105, at 656. For a discussion of the economic potential of
this satellite data, see Bylinsky, supra note 99, at 130.
113. Umali, supra note 98, at 17.
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D. Science and Technology Information-ARPANET,
TELENET, CSNET, and VNET
Scientists consider uninhibited exchange of information across
national boundaries to be essential to their work. Transfer of data
subjects new discoveries and theories to the scrutiny of peers in
other laboratories for verification or disproof. Scientific knowledge
is cumulative-each scientist learns from the work of others. Open
access to information stimulates creativity as scientists compete to
be first in publishing research and discovering new areas of in-
quiry. Because no single country has a monopoly of scientific tal-
ent, communication among research scientists is international.
Scientists historically have transferred scientific and technological
information by hand, through oral communication, or through the
mails by publication of scientific findings in journals. Scientists
distribute and read over 2,000 scientific journals. The essential
transnational nature of these publications is evident: American au-
thors write only thirty-seven percent of the articles that appear in
these journals.114 Moreover, American researchers frequently cite
foreign research results. 115
Despite the desire of scientists to maintain free transfer of in-
formation, governmental interest in restricting information for na-
tional security purposes is increasing. This part of the Article fo-
cuses on the types of restrictions and regulations that the United
States government places upon the transborder flow of scientific
data. The United States government restricts transfer of scientific
information to protect national security interests in five ways: (1)
classification restricting access; (2) export control; (3) restrictions
upon acceptance of federal funds; (4) voluntary agreements; and
(5) control of foreign visitors. The categories of information eligible
for classification include "scientific, technological, or economic
matters relating to the national security""" and "cryptology."11 A
114. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE INDICATORS 1980, at 17 (1981).
115. Id. at 18.
116. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1982).
117. Id. Cryptology in this context covers "all aspects of code work. . . ." J. Bamford,
The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency 29 (1982) (providing an in-
depth description of the National Security Agency operations). Cryptology includes both the
making and breaking of codes and currently is of great importance to national security insti-
tutions needing the latest application of scientific and technological theories to carry out
effectively their eavesdropping and codebreaking operations. See generally id.
Cryptographic protection of communications transmissions via satellite relies upon the
use of computer scrambling devices called cryptographic interference units (CIU). Each user
of the satellite system connects at an access point termed a network security center. All
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specific exemption exists for "[b]asic scientific research informa-
tion not clearly related to the national security."" 8
Transborder transfer of scrutiny information occurs under a
system that international agreements established through the Co-
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. The Com-
mittee is a voluntary organization for the consideration of trade
controls on exports to the Warsaw Pact countries and the People's
Republic of China. The group consists of all the NATO countries
except Iceland and Japan. Only its member nation states, however,
can implement its decisions." 9
The federal government may restrict transfers of unclassified
technical data under an export control system that consists of the
Export Administration Act (EAA) 20 and the Arms Export Control
Act. '' The Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 22 promul-
gated by the United States Department of Commerce, implement
the EAA, which governs the export of information that has both
military and civilian applications. The EAA authorizes export con-
trols to further national security, foster foreign policy, or protect
the domestic economy from a drain of scarce materials. 23 The
EAR control "technical data.' 24 An export of this data occurs
whenever one of the following events takes place: an actual trans-
mission of data out of the United States, a release in the United
States with the knowledge that the data will be shipped out of the
country, or a release abroad.2 5
transmissions pass through a CIU; only properly authorized locations on the system may
receive the communication thereafter. See PROTOCOLS, supra note 30, at 369-429 (security in
computer networks).
Interception of the satellite beam is feasible; the reception, however, is worthless unless
a cryptoanalyst is able to break the code. Bamford, at 31-281. Thus, the restriction of access
to a nation's cryptologic information is paramount to national security.
118. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 170 (1982). See National Academy of Sci-
ences, Scientific Communication and National Security 28 (1982).
119. The United States established the Consultative Group-Coordinating Committee
in 1945 to impose an embargo on the shipment of strategic technologies from the allied
countries to the Eastern Bloc. COCOM's functions include preparing an international list of
embargo items, processing requests for exceptions to the export list, and consulting on ex-
port control enforcement. T. ECKERT, THE TRANSFER OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUN-
TRIES: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL POLICY AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 16-17
(Princeton University Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 47, June
1981).
120. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
121. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
122. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-399.2 (1982).
123. 50 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
124. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 (1982).
125. Id. § 379.1(b).
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The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)2'e of
the United States Department of State effectuate the Arms Export
Control Act, which addresses exports with strategic value. Any ex-
port of technical data requires prior approval and a license by the
Office of Munitions Control in the Department of State.127 No dis-
tinctions exist among various export destinations, except for Can-
ada, to which this requirement does not apply. Although the cate-
gories of data transfer that are subject to ITAR are narrower than
the categories that the EAR cover, the ITAR controls are broader
reaching because of their geographical sweep. Both sets of regula-
tions provide criminal and administrative remedies to punish vio-
lators of their rules.12 8
To export technical data the EAR require that the exporters
either obtain a general license 12 9 or a validated license.130 A general
license is analogous to an exemption; it is effective automatically
by force of regulation without an application or document author-
izing the export. The general license is available for "[d]ata that
have been made generally available to the public" through publica-
tions "that may be purchased without restrictions at a nominal
cost or obtained without cost or are readily available at libraries
open to the public" or through "open conferences."'' The license
is also available for scientific data that is not directly and signifi-
cantly "related to design, production, or utilization in industrial
processes. ' '11 2 A validated license, in contrast, authorizes a specific
export of data. The Office of Export Administration of the Depart-
ment of Commerce issues the validated license in response to a
completed application form and a letter of explanation from the
proposed exporter.' 3
126. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-130.33 (1982).
127. Id. § 125.20-.24 (1982).
128. Id. §§ 127.01-.10 (1982); 15 C.F.R. §9 387.1-.14 (1982).
129. 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1982). Two types of general export licenses are available: the
general license GTDA, which covers "[tiechnical data available to all destinations," id. §
379.3 (1982), and the general license GTDR, which covers "[t]echnical data under restric-
tion," id. § 379.4 (1982).
130. Id. § 372.2.
131. Id. § 379.3 (a). Wilful violations of the export regulations subject corporations to
penalties of five times the value of the export up to $1,000,000. Individuals are subject to
penalties of up to $250,000, or as many as 10 years in jail, or both. 50 U.S.C. § 2410(b) (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Violators, however, more often are subject to administrative remedies such
as seizure, forfeiture, or loss of export/import privileges. 50 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). An aggressive effort by the Departments of Commerce and Treasury called "Pro-
ject Exodus" has increased enforcement of the export regulations.
132. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3(b)(1) (1982).
133. Id. § 379.5.
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In 1981 the Office of Export Administration processed over
73,000 applications for validated licenses.134 Most of these requests
were from industrial firms. Apparently, increasing control of tech-
nical data exports will result from changes in the agency's control
system and from a growing concern in the intelligence community
that these exports contribute to the competitive disadvantage that
the United States is experiencing internationally.
In response to fears that America is losing its competitive ad-
vantage, United States policy is moving toward more sophisticated
controls on transborder flows of technological data. In 1976 a De-
fense Science Board task force proposed that the export control
system should shift its focus from the products themselves to the
technology that is critical to design and manufacturing capabil-
ity.1 " The report recommended that the export control system
should place primary emphasis on (1) arrays of design and manu-
facturing knowledge; (2) "keystone" manufacturing, inspection,
and test equipment; and (3) products requiring sophisticated oper-
ation, application, or maintenance ability.1 6 The task force con-
cluded that the American lead in critical technological areas was
becoming increasingly difficult to preserve but that the United
States could maintain its advantage in two ways: by denying the
export of technology when it represented revolutionary rather than
evolutionary advances, and by strengthening the export control
laws in the United States and allied nations.
1 37
In 1979 Congress incorporated into the EAR the defensive
technology export policy that the task force had recommended. 13
Congress directed the United States Secretary of Defense to de-
velop a list of militarily critical technologies; the list now covers a
broad spectrum of technologies, including many with nonmilitary
applications. The Arms Export Control Act and the ITAR control
export of such strategic information.139 The Secretary of Defense's
list includes a category for "technical data" pertaining to the listed
items. Like EAR, ITAR define the term "technical data" to in-
clude "any technology which advances the state-of-the-art or es-
134. U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FIscAL YEAR 1981,
at 10 (1982).
135. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON EXPORT OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY, AN ANALY-
sis OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U. S. TECHNOLOGY-A DOD PERSPECTIVE (1976) (popularly called
the Bucy report).
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 14.
138. See 15 C.F.R. § 379 (1982).
139. 22 U.S.C. . 2778 (1976).
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tablishes a new art in an area of significant military applicability in
the United States.
140
The United States government can regulate the transmission
of technical data by means other than statutory controls.14 1 As a
major source of funds for university research the government ap-
parently can impose restrictions on grant recipients to prevent
communication of technical data. These restrictive stipulations in
contracts may inhibit severely the free flow of transborder data
from university and industrial research laboratories. This inhibited
flow could impede the movement of information that scientists and
researchers consider essential and limit the global interaction that
stimulates innovation throughout the world.
Monitoring the flow of data from university research centers
to ascertain whether to apply the various regulations is particularly
difficult. Laboratory researchers create data flow networks using
high speed data links, such as the ARPANET, a computer system
that the United States Department of Defense developed in the
early 1970's and funds as an experimental computerized environ-
ment for researchers on Defense Department contracts."42 The
original purpose of ARPANET was to promote load sharing among
expensive computers at universities, but the system soon became
the testbed for electronic mail and data exchange. TELENET, an-
other computer system, had its origin in ARPANET concepts and
provides packet switching services internationally.143  Today
140. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 125.
141. In the United States the Constitution provides the most significant restraint on
the government's ability to regulate technical communications. Scientific and technical com-
munications generally appear to deserve at least some first amendment protection. See
United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1978) (government interpreta-
tion of the scope of affected data in ITAR regulations impermissibly broad under the first
amendment). The United States Supreme Court has stated clearly that the first amendment
protects the right both to speak and to receive information. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). In addition, the first amendment protects the right to communi-
cate not only with other citizens but also with foreigners. Id. The first amendment, however,
does not invalidate all governmental controls on the flow of technical data. Moreover, the
Supreme Court never has faced the first amendment rights of citizens beyond American
boundaries. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981). Nor does the first amendment im-
munize communications concerning data that is an integral part of a transaction which the
government has power to regulate. Traditional first amendment analysis applies a balancing
test in which speech may be restricted if the governmental interest is sufficiently
compelling.
142. Newell & Sproull, Computer Networks: Prospects for Scientists, 215 SCIENCE
843, 846-47 (1982); PROCEzDmS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICA-
TIONS 273 (Oct. 27, 1980).
143. Crocker, Heafner, Metcalfe, & Postel, Function-Oriented Protocols for the ARPA
Computer Network, 40 AFIPS Conference Proceedings 271 (1972), reprinted in COMPUTER
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TELENET and its competitor, TYMNET, provide the communi-
cations support for a wide variety of information services through
which scientists communicate internationally.
Other computer networks also transmit research data across
national lines. In the United States, the National Science Founda-
tion is funding the rapid growth of CSNET, which will connect to
ARPANET and inevitably seek connection to information net-
works in other countries. 144 Scientists working for corporations use
proprietary networks for research and development collaboration
internationally. For example, the IBM Corporation's internal com-
puter system, VNET, reportedly connects over 1100 computers in
150 major cities in 34 countries using leased lines for interconnec-
tion.145 Not only does data exchange occur over this network, but
also researchers can use it to collaborate on research and develop-
ment. Data flow networks may make the conventional concepts of
export control for technical data difficult to apply when the same
idea emerges concurrently from scientists in several countries.
E. Other Global Networks
A number of other global data networks function today. These
networks transmit a variety of data, which recipients desire for a
broad spectrum of purposes. A brief survey of these networks,
combined with the foregoing examination of the major avenues of
transborder data flow, reveal the different settings in which legal
issues concerning data transport can arise.
The weather satellite, NIMBUS, operated by The National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, provides pictures
of global geology, with weather fronts plotted and hurricane watch-
es organized, to warn of meteorological disasters. The morning tel-
evision news has changed radically with the advent of "real time"
satellite pictures, which permit forecasters graphically to analyze
on television monitors the rain clouds and sunshine. No inherent
reason other than cost exists to prevent these weather pictures
from being available worldwide via satellite directly to any point
on the globe. The World Weather Watch uses some of the largest
and most sophisticated computers in operation. 148
COMMUNICATIONS 318 (P. Green & R. Lucky eds. 1975); Newell & Sproull, supra note 142, at
846-47. See HnLTz & TUROFF, supra note 1, at 138-39.
144. Newell & Sproull, supra note 142, at 851.
145. Telephone interview with George Kettell, manager of IBM's VNET project office
(Nov. 3, 1983).
146. For a discdssion of the use of "supercomputers" in meteorological forecasting, see
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Another significant use of remote data recovery is a system
called Remote Continual Verification (RECOVER). RECOVER is
an international system of electronic devices that the 110 member
nations of the International Atomic Energy Agency 147 currently are
installing at 672 facilities. The system's primary surveillance de-
vices detect hazards to safety in the use of nuclear installations
and report to a central computer console in Vienna. Data transport
occurs over hardwired dedicated lines, radio frequency transceiv-
ers, and data overlay on existing electric power lines. Scientists
designed RECOVER to be reliable under adverse environmental
conditions, timely in its reporting capability, simple, safe, and op-
erable without human assistance.
The entertainment and informational uses of satellite systems
are proliferating, primarily through the use of domestic satellites
or by interconnection through the INTELSAT system. The global
impact of instantaneous, worldwide distribution of television sig-
nals was most dramatic during the moon landing of July 20, 1969,
only one week after the INTELSAT system became operational.
Transmitting pictures for twenty-two hours of uninterrupted cov-
erage required the cooperation and teamwork from four countries
and one interstellar body. Following transmission of the picture
from the surface of the moon to the space tracking station in the
Red Center of Australia, the image went via INTELSAT to James-
burg, California, then by NASA radio relay to Houston, Texas,
from there via a Pacific satellite to Tokyo, via an Atlantic satellite
to Goonhilly Downs in the United Kingdom and from there by the
Eurovision network to participating national networks.1 48 A truly
global audience, estimated at 538 million, watched. Global audi-
ences like this one now have become commonplace. Global wed-
dings, as well as global funerals, take place with growing frequency.
In addition, an estimated two billion viewers will see the 1984
Olympics. 49
Other networks connect remote habitations with each other
and with the rest of the world. For example, the PEACESAT net-
Levine, Supercomputers, 246 Sci. AM. 118, 120 (1982).
147. The International Atomic Energy Agency, established in 1957, promotes the use
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and ensures that its offices do not further any mili-
tary purpose. The agency is an autonomous international organization within the United
Nations System. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 20 YEARS INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY 1957-1977 1-9 (1977).
148. See INTELSAT Conference, supra note 62, at 17.
149. Id. at 31.
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work in the South Pacific has involved the most extensive use of
satellites. PEACESAT operated in an area of the South Pacific
where islands are widely dispersed. The Indian Satellite Instruc-
tional Television Experiment (SITE),150 the Canadian CTS, and
the American ATS 3 and 6 satellites successfully have demon-
strated educational and medical uses of communications in remote
villages in India, Alaska, and the northern territories of Canada.
Although educational users of satellite systems are in an ear-
lier stage of development than other users, educational uses are
not primitive. Computer based education is developing slowly in
the United States, and the systems have great potential for inter-
national networking between both developed and developing coun-
tries. The PLATO system of the Control Data Corporation (CDC)
is one of the earliest educational prototype systems and among the
most powerful. Permitting individualized instruction of a very so-
phisticated and highly interactive nature, the PLATO terminals
are useful on site for everything from remedial education in schools
to flight simulation for apprentice pilots. CDC also operates a net-
work of more than fifty learning centers in cities around the
United States and trains professionals around the world in a vari-
ety of specialties at its Institute of Advanced Technologies. CDC
maintains very specialized data processing services for a broad
range of scientific and engineering applications through its
CYBERNET data base services, which are available throughout
the United States and Canada and in twenty-four other nations.
CDC is a full service remote data processing service and provides
access to a complete range of specialized remote transactions, in-
cluding credit verification, stock brokerage, computerized ticket
purchases (TICKETRON), television viewing habits (ARBI-
TRON), employment opportunities (CYBERSEARCH), bookkeep-
ing for credit unions (FOCUS), and a global technology data base
(TECHNOTEC).
CDC, however, like other remote data processors, has encoun-
tered difficulties in numerous countries in obtaining private leased
lines to serve its remote customers worldwide. A variety of reasons
motivate these refusals, including the desire of some nations to
keep control of all data services and resulting revenue, and a na-
tional telematics policy to preserve data processing services for a
local entity or nationally controlled subsidiary. Such policies may
not be in the refusing nation's best interests, however, as Stephen
150. See Imakita, supra note 75, at 9.
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Beach, Associate General Counsel for CDC, has observed: "Those
countries that seek to impose barriers beyond legitimate self inter-
ests will fence themselves in as well as keeping others out. They
will not obtain the world's technology or the data bases of informa-
tion which they seek." '151
V. EMERGING GLOBAL LEGAL IssuEs
A. Privacy
As personal data increasingly has found refuge in the memory
banks of large computers, concerns about the accuracy, accessibil-
ity, and use of this information have grown rapidly both in the
United States and abroad. The United States has been the leader
in enacting legislation to protect the privacy interests of individu-
als in personal data. Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974,152
followed by the Freedom of Information Act,5 the Fair Credit
Billing and Reporting Acts,154 and, more recently, the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act.155 Privacy legislation embodies principles of
openness and disclosure about the existence of data banks and
protects the rights of individuals to obtain, challenge, correct, or
expunge inaccurate information.1 56 The Privacy Act of 1974 man-
dated the creation of a Privacy Protection Study Commission,
which conducted a major analysis of privacy policy.
1 57
Since the mid-1970's, when European countries began to fol-
low the American lead in protecting privacy interests, international
organizations have noted that a patchwork quilt of different na-
tional laws-allegedly protecting the privacy of their nation-
als-could wreak havoc with the internal personnel management
and information flow of transnational companies.105 As the number
of nations enacting such laws increases, international desire to har-
monize these laws is strengthening.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
151. S. Beach, Non-Tariff Trade Barriers-U.S. Response 3 (Aug. 10, 1982) (transcript
of speech presented at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
154. Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1602, 1610, 1631-1632, 1637, 1666-1666j
(1976); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976).
155. 12 U.S.C.S. § 3401-3422 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); 31 U.S.C.S. § 1051 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1982).
156. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION SocIETY 501 (1977).
157. Id.
158. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 18.
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(OECD) and the Council of Europe (CoE) have initiated efforts to
develop guidelines 59 for harmonization of privacy protection laws
among their member nations. 60 The provisions and force of the
two groups' guidelines differ. Whereas the CoE Convention on pri-
vacy legislation is legally binding on signatory nations, the OECD
guidelines are voluntary.'6 ' Little difference in effect may result,
however, because both contain ineffective sanctions. 6 2 The CoE
Convention is narrower and more specific than the OECD guide-
lines. It covers only automated data base information, while the
OECD guidelines cover both automated and conventionally stored
information. 63 Both sets of standards cover the public and private
sectors; in contrast United States legislation addresses primarily
federal agency, educational, and credit records of individuals.6
None of the rules discussed above protects the privacy of cor-
porations, although several national legislative enactments do
cover data banks operated by corporate entities. Surprisingly, not
all transnational companies do not welcome protection of corporate
information. Because a substantial part of a corporation's strategic
planning may depend upon information about its corporate com-
petitors, a company could suffer a disadvantage if its competitors
could obtain access to this data.
1 5
The CoE Convention contains several safeguards for trans-
border data flow that balance the privacy protections which other-
wise might inhibit the movement of information. First, the Con-
vention prohibits signatories from disallowing transnational flows
159. The CoE proposed the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, TRANSNAT'L DATA REP., Vol. 3, No. 6, at 17
(1980). The OECD put forth the Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data, TRANSNAT'L DATA REP., Vol. 4, No. 1, at 45 (1981).
160. The membership of the two groups is quite similar. CoE has twenty members,
only three of which-Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta-are not members of OECD as well.
Of the twenty-four members of OECD, only six are not in the European Economic Commu-
nity (Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States). OECD AT A
GLANCE (1982). Every nation in the two groups has privacy legislation or is considering rec-
ommendations for legislation by privacy commissions. See Patrick, Privacy Restrictions on
Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of the Council of Europe Draft Convention and
the OECD Guidelines, 21 JuviMmrmcs 405, 406-08 (1981).
161. Patrick, supra note 160, at 407.
162. Member nations usually follow these rules, however, as a matter of convenience.
Coombe, Multinational Codes of Conduct and Corporate Accountability: New Opportuni-
ties for Corporate Counsel, 36 Bus. LAW. 17 (1980); Patrick, supra note 160, at 419.
163. Patrick, supra note 160, at 408.
164. Patrick, supra note 160, at 420.
165. Maisonrouge, Regulation of International Information Flows, 1 THE INFORMA-
TION SOCmTY 17, 22 (1981).
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solely upon the grounds of privacy protection. Second, it admon-
ishes member nations not to create obstacles to transborder data
flows that exceed requirements for privacy protection. Third, the
Convention requires members to take reasonable steps to ensure
uninterrupted and secure transit of data through member coun-
tries. Last, the rules urge nations not to obstruct transborder data
flow unless the domestic legislation of another nation does not pro-
vide equivalent privacy protection and hence no danger exists of
circumventing that country's laws. The Convention forces a har-
monization of national privacy laws.16
A prime motivating force behind the CoE efforts to preserve
transborder data flow freedom and equalize national privacy laws
is the knowledge that the European Economic Community's larg-
est unexploited opportunity is to develop the combined market of
its member states to provide a competitive environment equal to
or better than the one that historically has been available to large
corporations in the United States. Thus, the harmonization of pri-
vacy legislation is part of the Community's attempt to expand the
"teleinformatics" industry to provide a foundation of economic
growth and development in the region.117
B. Criminal Action
Because banks have been at the forefront of computerization
and traditionally have attracted embezzlers and other avaricious
and enterprising individuals, financial transactions, not surpris-
ingly, have become the target of computer pirates. The most noto-
rious case is that of United States v. Rifkin,""8 which concerned an
international interbank transfer. Rifkin was an employee in the
"wire room" of Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles. The
wire room is the hub of a computerized system that transfers two
to four billion dollars of funds every day. By manipulating this sys-
tem, Rifkin successfully transferred $10.2 million through the Ir-
ving Trust Company in New York to the Wozchod Handels Bank
in Zurich, Switzerland, and later reduced the proceeds to the con-
tents of an ashtray overflowing with Russian diamonds. Rifkin was
apprehended, tried, and sentenced to eight years in federal prison,
despite a plea by his attorney that the authorities should permit
166. Patrick, supra note 160, at 417.
167. Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of the New Informations Technolo-
gies: A Teleinformatics Strategy for the 1980's, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237, 245 (1981).
168. No. CR 78-1050-WMB (C.D. Cal.).
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this computer genius to remain free as a consultant to businesses
that needed his expertise to devise security systems which other
computer thieves could not invade electronically.
169
Society has not punished all acts of computer piracy as it did
Rifkin's crime. Unauthorized invasions of computerized systems
have outdistanced the attempts of American legislators to keep up
with the technological opportunities for criminal behavior. As re-
cently as 1974 only forty-two percent of the states had effective
legislation prohibiting theft of computer software and only twenty-
four percent had legislation concerning theft of computer time.
170
In addition, the press tends to glorify the actions of computer
thieves.17 1 Perpetrators of this type of crime have been successful
in establishing themselves as advisers to the very institutions from
which they have taken computer time, or altered or pirated data.
172
As micro and minicomputers proliferate and interconnect over
various information transport systems, the opportunities for em-
bezzlement of electronic funds in the process of transfer, piracy of
proprietary signals or services, and deliberate damage to persons or
property from the alteration of data will increase exponentially. To
ensure a global environment in which the transfer of data can take
place securely, without alteration or diversion between users, legis-
latures must develop laws prohibiting computer crimes. These laws
must be compatible and enforceable regardless of the locus of the
crime, because the embezzlement, distortion, destruction, or other-
wise unauthorized use of data may occur in outer space or within a
radio frequency band at high altitudes where sovereign rights and
responsibilities may be very cloudy indeed.
C. Contract and Tort Liability
Together, contract and tort liability are one of the most vola-
tile and interesting areas for legal development in the transborder
data flow field. No great body of case law on tort liability in the
transborder data flow area yet exists, but the potential for uninten-
tional torts increases as people use computers more widely both at
home and abroad.1 7 8 For example, computers can cause physical
169. Bloombecker, Rifkin, A Documentary History, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 471 (1980).
170. D. PARKER, S. NycuM, & S. OURA, COMPUTER ABUSE (Stanford Research Institute
1975).
171. Bloombecker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 21 JURiMETRICS 421, 429 (1981).
172. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1983, at 45.
173. How the American judiciary will adapt its tort principles to cases concerning elec-
tronic transfers is unclear. In Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982),
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damage: malfunctioning systems can endanger medical patients;
erroneous input or processing can injure credit ratings, endanger
air transportation, or unleash a debt collector against a citizen
whose payments are timely.17 4 One court has awarded damages of
over $200,000 for unfair competition stemming from unauthorized
remote access to a data bank.
17 5
Some business organizations potentially may become liable for
failure to use computer services-technological "nonfeasance"-in
addition to misuse of these services. This situation would be com-
parable to the cases holding tugboats negligent for not using their
radios. International regulations that require ships at sea to have
available radio transmitters and to keep their receivers open on a
specified channel to ensure the safety of all navigable vessels17 6
also are analogous; the failure of a crew to use these transmitters
would be negligence.
Another basis of litigation may be the defendant's reliance
upon a computer when human judgment should have intervened.
In an unforgettable Ford Motor Credit Company case a computer
error caused the company to repossess an automobile that be-
longed to a customer who had been making his payments quite
promptly.177 As electronic videotext and videotext begin to provide
traditional news and information services directly to home termi-
nals, opportunities for tortfeasance, such as defamation or libel,
will arise. The problems will be especially thorny as distributing
networks permit increasingly large numbers of entrepreneurs ac-
cess to the information distribution system worldwide. Questions
about insurability and risk assessment in a global information en-
vironment containing a multiplicity of user networks may inhibit
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case in which Swiss Bank Corporation
failed to transfer $27,000 that an Illinois bank had telexed, intending the money to be pay-
ment for the lease of a vessel. The District Court had held that Swiss Bank Corporation had
been negligent in its failure to make the payment and assessed damages of $2.1 million.
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820, 829, 835 (N.D. Il1. 1981). The Seventh
Circuit reversed, noting that the plaintiff should have known "that messages sometimes get
lost or delayed in transit... even when all the banks are using reasonable care." 673 F.2d
at 957. The sharp disagreement between the district and circuit courts in this case high-
lights the potential for a conflict between the circuits as more of these cases arise.
174. R. BIGELOW & S. NYCUM, YOUR COMPUTER AND THE LAW 136 (1975).
175. For a discussion of the unreported decision in People v. Ward, a California mu-
nicipal court case, see Bloombecker, supra note 171, at 423-24.
176. Agreement for the Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio,
Dec. 19, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 2523, T.I.A.S. No. 9352.
177. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) ("Trust in
the infallibility of a computer is hardly a defense.").
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the development of such a diverse information marketplace. Lia-
bility is far simpler to assess within a system in which corporations
and public networks assume responsibility for the content of the
information as well as for the management of the information
transport system.
D. Proprietary Rights in Information
[I]s information on the international level an intellectual asset which belongs
to the whole of humanity or is it also a marketable asset? 17 8
In economic terms, data flow obviously will slow down if no
market value exists for the offered information products and ser-
vices. Because the monetary value of information is of key impor-
tance in the market, a clear delineation of the rights in intellectual
property is necessary when the international marketplace is con-
cerned. Unfortunately, substantial misunderstanding and disagree-
ment may arise about the value of information. The economics of
information is a new and underdeveloped discipline, although some
scholars have made notable efforts to remedy that situation. 17 9
Historically, a paradox has existed between the promotion of
progress through wide dissemination of knowledge and the protec-
tion of the economic interests of those who contribute to the devel-
opment of new knowledge. The founders recognized this conflict of
interests, and the Constitution purports both to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts" 180 and to protect the proprietary
rights of artists, writers, and inventors through a system of copy-
right and patent protection. Thus, one strand of United States pol-
icy long has recognized the contribution of the free flow of ideas to
innovation and productivity. This causal relationship has not es-
caped the notice of developing countries,181 which may desire a
freer flow of data into their hands. Determining the kind of in-
formation flows that government should refuse to inhibit and the
costs associated with technology transfer is troublesome in a global
context.
178. Lemoine, supra note 23.
179. See, e.g., EcONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE (D. Lamberton ed. 1971);
F. MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRmUTION or KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNrrED STATES
(1962); Arrow, The Economics of Information, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A TWENTY YEAR
Vmw (M. Dertouzos & J. Moses eds. 1979); O'Brien & Helleiner, The Political Economy of
Information in a Changing International Order, 34 INT'L ORG. 445 (1980); Wunderlich,
Property Rights and Information, 412 ANNALS 80 (1974).
180. U.S. CONST., art. I § 8, cl. 8.
181. Feldman, Commercial Speech, Transborder Data Flows and the Right to Com-
municate under International Law, 17 INT'L LAW., 87, 87-88 (1983).
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The question of the applicability of the present system of cop-
yright, patent, and trademark protection to the new forms of infor-
mation also is disconcerting. Substantial evidence exists that legal
distinctions developed for the printing press and the copies im-
printed in a permanent form simply do not protect adequately the
interest of participants in the dynamic electronic environment.
New rules may be necessary when "authors" are in various loca-
tions contributing their intellectual input either simultaneously or
consecutively into a "work product" that may never be fixed or
permanent.
Professor Pool and Mr. Solomon have noted the difficulties as-
sociated with protecting proprietary rights in electronic
information:
First, liability is incurred neither at input nor at output, but within the
computer network. Second, what protects the author or publisher is physical
control of the text for there is no count of its reproduction once it is out of
his hands. Third, a billing system operated by the network is necessary if fee
collection is to be easy. Without that there is too much red tape in making
arrangements for occasional access. Fourth, once the publisher's text has
been read by someone else, evasion of royalty payments is quite easy because
the reader can store the text in his computer and do whatever he wants with
it. Computer copying is even easier than photocopying. 18
Observing that "[e]very reading of computer output requires the
regeneration of it; every reading is a printing,"1 s3 Professor Pool
and Mr. Solomon warn that traditional legal protection may not be
adequate to protect proprietary rights in information. The peril,
they note, is particularly great in the new international trade envi-
ronment in which "[i]nformation in a pure form is one of the new-
est private industries. ' " These scholars, however, see premature
conventions or legislation as impediments to innovation in the de-
velopment of information systems and suggest that the wiser
course is to consider the legal problems of transborder data flow
primarily as international issues.18 5 Thus, the priority concerns in
legal development should be to delineate what constitutes com-
puter fraud, abuse, negligence, breach of contract and to provide
mechanisms through which such grievances may be redressed."'
182. Id. at 123.
183. Id. at 121.
184. Id. at 133.
185. Id. at 136-39.
186. Id. at 137-38.
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E. Ownership of and Access to Information
Another thorny legal question concerns the ownership or right
to lease transmission systems and the right of the owner, lessor,
lessee, or user of the system to control the content of the message
transmitted. Historically, legislation in the United States has seg-
mented different types of transmission services and endowed each
one with a distinct regulatory system. At least seven models of reg-
ulation for various data transmission systems exist. The continued
usefulness of any of these models or their hybrids as transborder
data flow becomes increasingly sophisticated is uncertain.
Lawmakers may change radically or even discard some of these
models. Nevertheless, these paradigms provide necessary starting
points in the development of the legal environment for transborder
data flow. They are as follows:
(1) The print media is a virtually unregulated system. The
first amendment tolerates no licensing of entry into the print me-
dia.187 No right of reply exists, and the right of access to the print
pages or to the newspaper columns is not legally enforceable. 188
(2) Broadcasting is a regulated system in which the govern-
ment licenses radio broadcasters to transmit on a given frequency.
The broadcasters must monitor the content of their transmission
for certain objectionable material. The regulations also require
them to be trustees of the public interest, to ensure that broadcast
content is fair, and to permit individuals as well as groups to reply
to personal attacks and questions of public controversy.l s9 Never-
theless, no mandatory right of access to the broadcasting system
exists, except to candidates for federal office.190
(3) For telephony the government has applied a common car-
rier policy,191 in which the carrier must accept all messages without
187. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
188. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
189. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 315 (1976). See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (fairness doctrine).
190. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
191. Traditionally, a common carrier is one who undertakes for hire to transport the
goods of those who may choose to employ him from place to place. He is, in general,
bound to take the goods of all who offer.... When he receives the goods, it is his duty
to take all possible care of them in their passage, make due transport and safe and
right delivery of them .... At common law, a carrier . . . is in the nature of an
insurer.
Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 Howard) 7, 22 (1858). See generally L. GORTON, THE CON-
cEPT OF THE COMMON CAR=x iN ANGLo-AmEICAN LAw (1971) (an exhaustive examination
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censorship or carrier interference except in the cases of obscenity
or personal harassment.192 A virtual monopoly at the national level
and a regulated monopoly at the local level traditionally have con-
trolled the transmission of vocal messages. The recent deregulatory
actions of the Federal Communications Commission and pressure
from the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, however,
have led to a more open competition in the interstate voice mes-
sage transmission system, with only the local operating company
retaining a monopoly.198
(4) For magazines, newsletter and direct mail solicitations the
system is in part regulated and in part free of regulation. The
postal service is a common carrier but the contents of the publica-
tions that the postal service transmits are not subject to regulation
unless the material is pornographic or so personally offensive that
recipients may prohibit delivery by filing a special form with the
local post office.194
(5) Record carrier services have been an oligopoly. Western
Union has provided the domestic telegraph services, and a group of
five international carriers have divided the international traffic
through authorized gateways that interconnect to the domestic
public switched network.9 5 Telegraphy has operated under
mandatory common carrier principles, and has permitted no cen-
sorship or monitoring of the content. In recent years, however, tel-
egraph and international telex services have become more competi-
tive. Western Union now may provide international services, and
the international record carriers may have direct access to domes-
tic customers without going through an authorized international
gateway.
19 6
(6) A hybrid regulatory system operated traditionally for cable
of the development of the common carrier's status as a link between public and private law).
192. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 223 (1976).
193. Consent Decree in United States v. AT&T, Nos. 74-1698, 82-0025 (D.D.C. Jan. 8,
1982); Modification of Judgment in United States v. AT&T, Nos. 74-1698, 82-0025 (D.D.C.
Aug. 24, 1982). See generally PRACTICING L. INST., AFTER THE AT&T Sgrmszrer, THE NEw
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ERA (1982).
194. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
195. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
196. Int'l Record Carrier's Communications, 58 F.C.C.2d 250, 254 (1976); see also Reg-
ulation of Domestic Public Message Service, 75 F.C.C.2d 345, 382 (1980) (statement of
Charles D. Ferris, Chairman); The International Record Carrier Competition Act of 1981:
Hearings on S.271 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on Com-




television. 197 A common carrier policy applied to some of the early
leased channels. Hence, the channels had to broadcast nearly all
material without censorship unless the contents were obscene or
harrassing. The locally originated channels, in contrast, followed
the broadcast model, and the pay services, a third form of cable
television, operated on the model of the print media. The courts,
however, recently have questioned the authority of the Federal
Communications Commission to make decisions about ownership
of and access to cable systems. Consequently, authorities at the
city or state level now must make these decisions.'98
(7) Satellite services operate under an "open skies" policy do-
mestically"'9 and through a quasi-monopoly carrier, INTELSAT,2 00
internationally. The difficult legal problems in satellite services
arise in video publishing of text on the television screen either by
broadcast or by telephone. Major questions, of course, concern
which model of ownership and access applies to these services.
Within the ISDNs,2 °' which digitalize and transmit all the differ-
ent satellite signals in a single jetstream, the problem is particu-
larly acute. Typologies that relate to allocations of different fre-
quencies are very awkward to apply to satellite transmissions. If
broadcasters provide text from the satellite transmission-the sys-
tem called teletext-government could regulate this service accord-
ing to the broadcast model. If the telephone company provides the
text-videotex-then a common carrier system of regulation might
be most appropriate. No model, however, is obviously best either
for teletext or for videotex. °2 Prestel, a videotex service in the
United Kingdom, operates on the print model; hence information
providers have complete control over satellite messages that they
transmit by the telephone system. Broadcasters in this country, in
contrast, tend to claim control over text imbedded in their trans-
missions, even though the Federal Communications Commission
could allocate the service to a different owner and operator for the
purpose both of ownership and of control over the message. 03 The
distinction is most problematic in a situation in which a newspaper
197. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1982).
198. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) aff'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
199. See Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972).
200. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
202. See Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, The Regulation of Electronic Publishing, 33
FED. CoM. L.J. 331 (1981).
203. Id. at 367.
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provides the service over a broadcast or telephone system, because
the newspaper is operating only as an information provider
through a cable, broadcast, or telephone system rather than as the
distributor of information in its traditional print mode.
The legal status of newspapers as information providers and
owners of the new technological systems of delivery is unclear. Nor
have lawmakers determined what rules should apply to remote
computer service vendors that operate videotex services over pri-
vate leased lines. The unanswered questions become even more
difficult if the sources of the information provided through the
electronic data service originate simultaneously from newspapers,
broadcasters, and common carriers, as well as from independent
information providers that have had no previous history with any
of the currently recognized service modes.
F. An Emerging Legal Right to Communicate
Interest is growing in the idea of establishing a legal right to
communicate across national boundaries-a right that would be in-
dependent of national authorities. This legal right would be tenu-
ous at best, however, because no legal forum exists in which to ad-
judicate it, and no independent authority exists to enforce it. At
present, the protection of basic human rights, including the right
to communicate, falls under the protective cover and responsibility
of the nation state to which the citizen who claims such rights has
allegiance. Nevertheless, some hopeful signs have appeared that
basic human rights may become universally recognized and litiga-
ble in courts other than those of the nations in which derogation of
the rights occurs.'"
Several international intergovernmental documents recognize
rights to communicate freely across national boundaries. The old-
est document is Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opin-
ion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opin-
ions without interference and to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 2 0 5
An American court has acknowledged that the declaration has uni-
versal validity and that the right is exercisable in a court of law
204. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
205. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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other than a court of the nationals who claim the right."' Sixty-
nine nations have entered into treaty obligations under the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,20 7 a document
that contains wording which is almost identical to the language of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.208 In addition, the
ITU20 9 has recognized "the right of the public to correspond by
means of international services of public correspondence."21 0 Vari-
ous treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation have estab-
lished the rights of nationals of treaty countries reciprocally to
"communicate freely with other persons inside and outside such
territories by mail, telegraph, and other means open to general
public use.",11
The organizations and nation states that have recognized the
right to communicate, however, generally have intended to accord
this right to members of the public for public correspondence and
to journalists for dispatching their stories to the print, audio, or
video media. Whether the signers of these statements intended the
right to extend to the transfer of information via computer for
commercial or other purposes is not clear. Authorities certainly
could read the words of international documents to imply this elec-
tronic age meaning. Furthermore, the interests of major trading
nations dictate establishment of these rights in the interests of a
healthy global economy. The likelihood of an unambiguous decla-
ration of the right to electronic communication, however, is small;
even if organizations and nation states recognized the right they
would clothe it in so many exceptions and ambiguities that any
nation state desiring to do so could easily circumvent its enforce-
206. See supra note 58.
207. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). United States
adherence to the Covenant is not fully established, since the United States Senate has not
yet ratified the President's signature. See Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 405, 421-24 (1979).
208. The pertinent language in the Covenant is: "Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
art. 19(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); see Feldman, supra note 181, at 87 ("The author be-
lieves a right to communicate already exists under international law that embraces ...
transborder data flows.").
209. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
210. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495,
T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
211. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, United States-West Germany,
Oct. 29, 1954, art. HI(4), 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1842, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
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ment. The ITU regulations, 1 ' for example, reserve the rights of
member nations to suspend services or to interfere with specific
transmission if security, public order, or morality dictates. 13 Fur-
thermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights permits cur-
tailment of the right to receive and impart information if other,
higher, human rights are in jeopardy or if considerations of "mo-
rality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic soci-
ety" carry higher priority.
2 14
Notwithstanding the current state of international law con-
cerning the enforceability of human rights, international public
opinion is a powerful deterrent to aberrant behavior. New telecom-
munications technologies may help advance the state of the law.
They may make national boundaries more permeable. Arthur C.
Clarke puts great faith in the ability of satellite communication to
reform human conduct:
The very existence of the myriads of new information channels, operating in
real-time and across all frontiers, will be a powerful influence for civilized
behavior. If you are arranging a massacre, it will be useless to shoot the cam-
eraman who has so inconveniently appeared on the scene. His pictures will
already be safe in the studio five thousand kilometres away; and his final
image may hang you.215
Although the communication rights that international groups
recognize admittedly are tenuous, nevertheless, including trans-
border data flow within the purview of these rights is preferable to
the present lacuna in international law in which nation states seem
to see transborder data flow regulations as within their power to
enact. As Feldman and Garcia have noted, the friendship, com-
merce, and navigation treaties that recognize a right to exchange
information do not include a right to operate communications fa-
cilities within a country.218 Thus, these treaties provide no help in
guaranteeing access to leased lines to establish data processing ser-
vices that the state operated PTTs do not offer. 17 This lack is a
source of major concern for both service providers and major trans-
212. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
213. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 19, 28 U.N.T.S.
2495, 2525, T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
214. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. at art. 29, A/810, at 77 (1948). -
215. Address by Arthur C. Clarke, Telecommunications Day, United Nations (May 17,
1983) (entitled "Beyond the Global Village").
216. Feldman & Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 8-10 (1982).




national corporations that use transborder data flow.2 '18 Further-
more, a right to transmit transborder data flow over the public
switched network of a host country would depend upon exclusion
of these data services from the definition of "domestic communica-
tions." Domestic communications are transmissions that a nation
state deems sensitive and excludes from both reciprocal "national
treatment" and from most favored nation treatment.2 19 The
United States has suffered for over a decade from the problems
inherent in trying to rid its regulatory processes of the distinction
between computer and communications services.22 0 This distinc-
tion has resulted in the more recent dichotomy between basic
(traditional and regulated) and enhanced (computerized and un-
regulated) services. 221 Fortunately for transnational companies,
substantial movement is occurring in some of the more developed
nation states to open up "enhanced" or computerized, communica-
tions services to competition.22 If the competition includes nonna-
tional service providers, a more open international market for
transborder data flow could develop.
Nonetheless, the absence of international and domestic law on
the subject forbodes substantial arguments and litigation until the
formulation of some internationally recognized principles. A great
need exists to develop a taxonomy of information that will estab-
lish priorities among types of information for the application of
either a regulatory or a free access mode. Uninhibited access would
apply to international communications facilities, but the taxonomy
would grant a lower priority to information whose very sensitive
nature indicates the necessity of substantial controls.2 The unin-
hibited-access class would include internal transborder data flow
218. Fishman, supra note 3, at 14-15.
219. Feldman, supra note 181, at 94.
220. The United States Federal Communications Commission defines "basic transmis-
sion services" as "pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually
transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information," Second Com-
puter Inquiry, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 420 (1980), Reconsideration Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50 (1980),
Further Reconsideration Order, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 (1981).
221. The Federal Communications Commission considers "enhanced services" to be
"all services offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communi-
cations, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interac-
tion with stored information." Computer I Implementation Proceeding, 89 F.C.C. 2d 694,
694 n.1 (1982).
222. Fishman, supra note 3, at 15.
223. See Novotny, supra note 19, at 141.
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within transnational companies, private correspondence of individ-
uals, diplomatic correspondence, journalistic reports, and health
and weather data. The more restricted class would contain strate-
gic, intelligence, and criminal data. The most problematic catego-
ries of information are the ones that highlight transnational varia-
tions in public morality and relate to the transfer of technology.
For example, although established procedures exist for rejecting
foreign films that are palatable to general audiences in the United
States but offensive in other nations,2 no technical method exists
for accommodating these concerns when the information is trans-
mitted in a merged digital bit stream.
G. Concepts of Territoriality
Legal concepts that concern different types of geographical ar-
eas vary considerably. For example, the law of the sea historically
has opened maritime areas to all compatible users; the law of phys-
ical land masses, however, has developed with a basic concept of
territoriality.225 Laws concerning air space have been a compromise
between land and sea law,228 but the line between territorial exclu-
sivity and shared use in airspace remains unclear. Some legal com-
mentators have urged the use of the Von Karmann line, the
threshold beyond which dynamic lift no longer is maintainable.2 1
The point at which a space satellite can sustain a stationary orbit
or the point of gravitational neutrality would be equally valid,
however, as would the distance beyond which a nation state cannot
shoot down an object flying over its territory. This "shooting
range" concept would be equivalent to the three mile territorial
limit beyond which the high seas became common property. The
three mile limit, which is based upon the distance that a cannon
could propel a cannonball,22 8 became technologically outmoded
224. CBS Evening News, Jan. 19, 1983.
225. But see The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 (signatory nations agree to cooperate in scientific endeavors in Antarctica and
not to enlarge any existing claims to sovereignty or assert any new claims to sovereignty on
the continent).
226. Compare Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. Nd. 1591 ("The contracting States recognize that every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.") with Treaty on Outer
Space, Jan. 27, 1967, United States-United Kingdom-U.S.S.R., art. 2, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2413,
T.I.A.S. 6347 ("Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.").
227. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 40, at 291-93.
228. Baty, Three Mile Limit, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 503, 505 (1928).
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with the development of aircraft. Obviously, the concepts applica-
ble to define shared and owned air space are as varied as the imag-
ination of legal scholars.229
Included in the Final Acts of the 1979 WARC was a resolution
guaranteeing "in practice for all countries equitable access to the
geostationary satellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated to
space services. ' 230 This admirable goal raises questions about the
legal definition of "equitable access." Even assuming that the
countries could reach an agreement on a definition for "equitable
access," it is not clear how such access could be guaranteed. The
WARC resolution considerably exceeds the admonition to member
nations of Article 33 that radio frequencies and orbital parking
places are limited natural resources which should be "used effi-
ciently and economically so that all countries . . . may have equi-
table access."23'
"Equitable access" is more nearly defined as fair access rather
than exact equality of access, although another WARC 79 resolu-
tion admonishes the ITU administration to consider that "all
countries have equal rights" to space.232 Thus it is not clear
whether access to space for communication purposes should be de-
termined on the basis of a common ownership of space, of a fair
allocation of communication services that considers need and tech-
nical ability, or of some absolute property right in a portion of
space.
None of these concepts of territoriality helps very much to es-
tablish rights in information that is in transit through the radio
magnetic spectrum to and from a geostationary satellite 22,300
miles out in space.233 In addition, the present jurisdictional scheme
perhaps underestimates the functional changes that have accompa-
nied the growth of large economic enterprises which operate trans-
nationally. Most of the jurisdictional aspects of territoriality oper-
229. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASiC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE
193-359 (1963).
230. Resolution B.P. Final Acts of WARC 1979.
231. 1973 Plenipotentiary responding to WARC 1971 Resolution Sp. 2-1.
232. See Memorandum of Martin A. Rothblatt to members of Working Group B,
Space Advisory Committee to the FCC (Mar. 17, 1982).
233. An accepted principle of international law does exist, however, stating that sover-
eign states have a right to object to transgression of their territory by offensive radio waves
through protest or jamming. Estep & Kearse, Space Communications and the Law: Ade-
quate International Control After 1963 60 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1963). Nations "may
interdict, by right, the passage of radiowaves through their territorial airspaces." Glazer,
supra note 40, at 292.
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ate under national systems of justice. Interestingly, a law of
merchants existed in the Middle Ages, which transcended territo-
rial boundaries and preceded the historical development of the na-
tion state as a powerful political entity. An examination of the
manner in which the lex mercatoria of the medieval merchants
functioned may be useful to determine its potential applicability to
today's growing global networks.2 4 In a world in which the annual
income of some transnational companies exceeds the gross national
product of many nations, parallel systems of governance may pro-
vide guidance in the development of an open telecommunications
system in which messages can flow freely from enterprise to enter-
prise, institution to institution, and person to person. A Japanese
legal scholar suggests: "In the administration-oriented economic
law field, we must also realize that the adherence to ego-influenced
exercises of sovereignty will only further confusion and confronta-
tion in a world of interdependence.""2 5
XI. PERSPEcTIVES
The legal issues that this Article addresses are only a few of
the many questions concerning transborder data flow that are
emerging in various national, regional, intergovernmental, and in-
ternational fora. For example, some legal theorists propose to tax
the flow of information by measuring the bit stream or the value of
the information that it contains.28 6 This plan is probably no more
ridiculous than taxing telephone calls, metering telephone rates, or
valuing business telephone services more highly than residential,
but the proposal clearly is threatening to free trade practices and
inimical to first amendment values. Other theorists argue for abso-
lutely unfettered flow of information, whether by newsprint or by
electrons.3 7 This view fails to consider the many ways in which all
nation states alter the flow of information to suit their political,
military, and economic strategies. 33
234. Sono, Sovereignty, This Strange Thing: Its Impact on Global Economic Order, 9
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 549, 557 (1979). For a scholarly discussion of the Lex Mercatoria,
see F. SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW (1930);
Teetor, England's Earliest Treatise on the Law Merchant, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 178 (1962).
235. Sono, supra note 234, at 557.
236. See, e.g., Madec, Economic and Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flows, OECD
Doc. EST I/lCCP 80.26 (1980), cited in Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics:
An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209 & n.26 (1981).
237. I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (forthcoming 1983).
238. See Hagelin, Prior Consent or the Free Flow of Information over International
Satellite Radio and Television: A Comparison and Critique of U.S. Domestic and Interna-
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Determining the appropriate legal restrictions and freedoms
for transborder data flow is a difficult task. Critics at either end of
the spectrum fail to reach satisfactory conclusions on this issue.
Proponents of a highly regulatory regime 3 doubtless are prema-
ture, because even if the components of a regulatory scheme were
obvious, governments would not know where or how to establish it.
On the other hand, uncompromising advocates of "free flow" are
out of touch with reality.24° Most of the world simply will not ac-
cept this practice. 241 The United States has no sanction with which
to force other countries to apply a facsimile of the first amend-
ment. Moreover, other nations consider the notion of freedom of
speech to be a peculiarly American policy that most benefits Amer-
ican information products and services. 42
Consequently, legal skirmishes in a multiplicity of legal arenas
are inevitable, and all interested parties must attempt to work out
the rules under which the implications of information societies in
an interdependent global economy will function. Whatever the re-
sults, unfettered competition among private corporate entities
clearly will not produce an international free marketplace in infor-
mation. The competitors in this marketplace by no means are all
private, and the interests at issue span public, private, and govern-
mental sectors. To achieve a workable system nations of the world
must combine hybrid policies when expediency dictates, cooperate
when cooperation is mandatory, and compete when the virtues of
competition are apparent, as in the stimulation of innovation.
The complexities of transborder data flow negotiations, litiga-
tions, and arbitrations-as well as the exhortations to conscience
and equity-are almost incomprehensible. The positions that each
tional Broadcast Policy, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 265 (1981); Levin, Foreign and
Domestic U.S. Policies, TELECOM. POL'Y, June 1982, at 123; Levin, Orbit and Spectrum Re-
source Strategies: Third World Demands, TELECOM. POL'Y, June 1981, at 102.
239. See, e.g., Bing Report, supra note 24; R. Groshan, Transnational Data Flows: Is
the Idea of an International Legal Regime Relevant in Establishing Multilateral Controls
and Legal Norms?, 15 L. TECH. 1 (1982); Hondius, The Legal Regulation of Information
and Data Processing, 2 IssuEs IN CoM. 29 (1978).
240. See I. POOL, supra note 144; Susman, The Western World and Third World's
Challenge in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 344-55 (J. Richstad &
M. Anderson eds. 1981); Theberge, UNESCO's New World Information Order: Colliding
with First Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714, 716 (1981).
241. See An Alliance for World Communications and Information (June 15-16, 1978)
(minutes of London meeting, Brussels Mandate).
242. See H. SCHILLER, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL DOMINATION 39-40 (1976); A.




party takes in disputes or negotiations will depend upon the par-
ticular perspective of the proponent. Available, reliable, accurate,
and low cost access to a variety of options in information services
may be of high priority to an individual. A multinational bank, in
contrast, will require high speed, secure, private line service to
specified locations and access to the public network for the deliv-
ery of financial information services to its customers. An ethnic or
religious group may want direct access to its members without in-
terference by governmental entities. A government, however, will
put a higher priority on gateway nodes, which provide a high level
of access control; deposit of data bases in its own country's files;
use of locally produced hardware and software; and the availability
of encryption keys to protect its national security interests and en-
courage development of its own information economy.24 3 Govern-
ment also may desire to control the content of traffic through its
territorial boundaries by reviewing applications and licensing only
the interests that coincide with its national priorities.
Proponents of a global perspective might argue for sharing
spectrum resources and expediting and giving high priority to so-
cial service systems that are available to all countries. Thus, people
who look upon themselves as "citizens of the world" favor informa-
tion systems that provide environmental monitoring, weather pre-
dictions to help prevent disruptions and loss from hurricanes and
typhoons, and that protect against terrorism, encourage law en-
forcement, expedite land use planning, and facilitate pestilence
control. A global system of information management would put
high priority on ISDNs,2 " which would guarantee to businesses,
institutions, and individuals anywhere on the network the world's
collective knowledge at their fingertips. This integrated network
ideal is like the "Networks for Knowledge" program that President
Lyndon Johnson espoused shortly before he announced his inten-
tion not to seek another term of office in 1968.25
An acquaintance with the varied objectives of competing inter-
est groups makes it easy to understand the policies that the differ-
ent nations espouse currently in the global dialogue about the New
243. Encryption is the encoding of a signal so that interceptors are unable to under-
stand the transmission without the "key" that deciphers the code. For further discussion of
the science of cryptology, see supra note 117.
244. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
245. See Gardner, Selling America in the Marketplace of Ideas, NEw YORK TMES
MAG., Mar. 20, 1983, at 44, 63.
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World Information Order (NWIO).24 6 Those countries, notably
Sweden,2 47 with the greatest concern about their societies' vulnera-
bility to data stored outside their national boundaries are pursuing
national policies to ensure information independence. Countries
like Japan that perceive the opportunities of a large information
marketplace are following strategies to give themselves the eco-
nomic capability to create their own hardware and software for
marketing to the rest of the world and, consequently, to strengthen
their own economies. 248 Countries that are vigorously pursuing na-
tional telematics policies include France24 9 and Brazil.25° Nations
that perceive themselves to be too small to develop the computer
capability within the confines of their own national boundaries are
working to combine their economies to compete more effectively.
The harmonization policies that the European Economic Commu-
nity has espoused are an example of this type of joint action. 51
Canada is a leader in concern about cultural sovereignty. Liv-
ing in close proximity to the United States, Canadians have devel-
oped a deep awareness about the loss of cultural identity and con-
trol over their own information resources. Canada has developed
transborder data flow policies in a number of fields including the
print media, motion pictures, direct broadcasting satellites, and
computers, and it has served as a model for many countries seek-
ing national telematics policies.252
Other organizations and their nation state members advocate
246. "The 'new world information order' has been heralded by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [(UNESCO)] as an attempt to facilitate
the free flow of information and condemned by western journalists as a step toward legiti-
mizing government control and censorship of the press." Theberge, supra note 240, at 714;
see International Satellite Communications and the New Information Order, 8 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 321 (1981). The NWIO idea has emerged gradually through UNESCO con-
ferences; it is a policy that promotes development of national communications infrastruc-
tures, as opposed to private sector control of communications. Theberge, supra note 240, at
716.
247. See COMMISSION ON NEw INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, NEw ViEws: COMPUTERS AND
NEw MEDIA-ANxILTr AND HOPES (1979); Freese, The Vulnerability of Computerized Soci-
ety, TRANSNAT'L DATA REP., voL 4, no. 5, at 21 (1981).
248. See Y. MASUDA, supra note 14, at 3-23; RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS AND ECONOMICS, A VISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE '80S (R. Varner trans. 1982).
249. S. NORA & A. MNC, THE COMPUTERIZATION OF SOCIErY (1978).
250. Brizida, supra note 11, at 19.
251. See Ramsey, supra note 167, at 248-52; supra note 169 and accompanying text.
252. See CONSULTATIVE COMMITrE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR
CANADIAN SOCIETY, CLYNE REPORT (1979); Ganley, Political Aspects of Communications and
Information Resources in Canada, 1 INFORMATION Soc'Y (1981); Ostry, Telecommunications
in Canada: Today, Tomorrow and Next Week?, 4 INTERMEDIA 6 (July 1979).
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liberal information trade policies. The thirty-seven member na-
tions in the Intergovernmental Bureau of Informatics (IBI) are ac-
tive in formulating policies of reciprocity, in which more informa-
tion will flow between developed and developing nations.5 3 Major
ferment has occurred within UNESCO over issues such as "bal-
anced information flow," the licensing of journalistic endeavors,
and the transfer of information technology to the developing na-
tions.254 International businesses within the International Chamber
of Commerce are pursuing a policy of liberalization; they are favor-
ing international trade in information products and services and
urging the availability of private leased lines for the development
of special purpose data networks.255
Only a policy in favor of greater international cooperation in
the development of global information resources seems to lack ad-
vocates.2 5s Like the United States, where the proliferation of spe-
cial interest lobbying groups makes it difficult to identify the col-
lective public interest, in the international arena a locus of
responsibility is difficult to find for ascertaining global interests
that may override rather than coincide with legitimate national
concerns. While a surplus of lawyers is available to represent cor-
porate, nonprofit, and governmental clients, few lawyers represent
the global common interest.
Daniel Bell, who has labored long and hard to understand the
social problems created by the new information technologies, has
stated:
We must try to think in terms of how one can bring all these matters
together in some intellectual coherence, in some intellectual framework, that
allows one to think of society not in terms of gadgets, because it is not gad-
gets which will change society, but modes of thought.
Today we have an international economy, but the political units are
national political units; and the relationships are unstable. We have
centrifugal and centripetal forces. We have an international economy, but
253. See Declaration of Mexico on Informatics, Development, and Peace (June 23,
1981); Issues on Transborder Data Flow Policies, supra note 22.
254. S. MACBRIDE, supra note 51 (containing a detailed exploration of these issues by
UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems).
255. Commission on Computing, Telecommunications and Information Policies,
Working Party, Telecommunications; The Liberalization of Telecommunications Ser-
vices-Needs and Limits (March 1982).
256. The major exception is the very substantial investment in both time and money
that nations have made in the development of the INTELSAT global information transport
system. The World Communications Year, which the International Telecommunications
Union initiated, also may be a major thrust in the direction of fomenting interest in global
perspectives.
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also a new international division of labour which is re-making and re-working
the entire world economy.
... [TJhen the national state has become too big for the small problems
of life and too small for the big problems of life.""7
Ample opportunities will arise in the days and years to come for
lawyers and public policy analysts to propose some coherent global
alternatives for rationalizing the legal environment in which elec-
tronic transfer of information across national boundaries occurs.
The proliferation of networking across such boundaries will not
abate. A number of alternatives are available to lawyers:
(1) They may follow the developments in such diverse arenas
as the 1BI, UNESCO, CoE, OECD, and the ITU and either react
to adverse circumstances affecting their clients or take a leadership
role in expounding policies that favor their clients.
(2) They may respond only in particular circumstances in
which their clients face litigation and thereby contribute in an ad
hoc manner to the developing body of law of international
networks.
(3) They may anticipate the legal problems that their clients
and their nation may face and devise working hypotheses concern-
ing such diverse legal questions as tort liability, conflicts of law,
criminal liability, and property rights.
(4) They may develop national legislative strategies or na-
tional teleinformatics policies to improve their own country's posi-
tion in the global competitive environment.
(5) They may develop strategies for a global system of infor-
mation transport and global sharing of information resources.
Transborder data flow rapidly is becoming an integral part of
the infrastructure that links societies globally. That this data flow
will continue to increase in importance is certain. Less clear, how-
ever, is how the United States258 and other nation states will re-
spond to the changes that transborder data flow and the global
links it inevitably provides will bring. This Article concludes with a
list of twenty principles that may serve as guides for develop-
ment.2 59 These principles rest on the ideal that an information
257. D. Bell, The Matching of Scales 13, 19, 21 (1979) (Louis G. Cowan Lecture of the
International Institute of Communications) (emphasis in original).
258. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text.
259. Although the author has developed these principles independently, a surprising
similarity exists between those enunciated in this Article and the principles that J.C.R.
Licklider and Albert Vezza have espoused. Licklider & Vezza, Applications of Information
Networks, 66 PROCEsDINOS OF THE IEEE 1330 (Nov. 1978). These authors describe 19 char-
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transport system which optimizes the opportunities for personal
and national interaction will serve best the world community of
nations. They are as follows:
(1) Availability: This concept concerns the physical existence
of telecommunications systems to serve global needs. Availability
not only implies the existence of telecommunications facilities, but
also actual channel space and operational readiness to receive and
transmit messages whenever and wherever users desire.
(2) Accessibility: According to the Japanese this concept is
even more inclusive than availability-it implies guaranteed use to
those who would like to claim the right.
(3) Authenticity: This principle concerns the ability to rely
upon messages stored, transmitted, or processed through electronic
systems to establish legal rights and obligations.
(4) Compatability: This principle assumes that technical sys-
tems can be interfaced.
(5) Diversity: This principle assures users access to a choice of
telecommunications services and information systems.
(6) Efficiency: An economic goal espoused in most national
policies, this principle means that the telecommunications system
should be cost effective for its intended purposes.
(7) Equity: Users should share both rights and responsibilities.
(8) Insurability: This concept concerns the ability to assess
risks and obtain insurance against unforeseen and uncontrollable
events and circumstances that disrupt service or impose loss upon
users.
(9) Integrity: This goal is message clarity and accuracy, which
permits the assurance that users will receive their messages with-
out error.
(10) Interactivity: This principle is the potential for immedi-
ate response in real time.
(11) Interoperability: This concept implies more than mere
"plug compatability." Interoperability concerns protocols for ac-
cess to, through, and across various public and private networks, so
acteristics that they believe computer networks frequently require: bi-directionality; free-
dom from error; efficiency despite "burstiness"; low cost per bit of information; high connec-
tivity; high information rate; security; privacy; authentication; high reliability; capability of
sending to and receiving from another station at once (full-duplex transmission); priority
service; speech capability; pictures; insensitivity to distance; short transit time delay;, uni-
form time delay; broadcast capability; mobility. Id. at 1337. Cf. Branscomb, Principles for
Global Telecommunications Systems, in WORLD COMMUNICATIONs: A HANDBOOK (forthcom-
ing 1983); infra text accompanying notes 259-62.
1042 [Vol. 36:985
GLOBAL NETWORKS
that no one arbitrarily can exclude users from the global system.
(12) Literacy: Telecommunications systems should be "user
friendly" and not inhibit use by nonprofessionals.
(13) Property: This principle addresses guaranteed protection
of recognized exclusivity rights in personal information. These
rights include the right to privacy and the right to release or with-
hold information concerning oneself, corporate rights to protect in-
formation transport that either is necessary to internal operations
or is a commodity in trade, the right to reward for intellectual pro-
ductivity, and the right to cultural sovereignty.
(14) Reciprocity: All users should have the same access to tele-
communications services and products as most favored nations.
(15) Redundancy: Under this principle if one information
transport system breaks down, an alternative channel is available.
(16) Reliability: Regularly established and uninterrupted ser-
vice should be available.
(17) Security: This principle concerns the protection of data
from disclosure or misuse and the assurance that the intended re-
cipient and no one else receives messages.
(18) Transparency: The user should not confront apparent in-
consistencies in operating systems or equipment.
(19) Universality: This is the ultimate goal of integrated ser-
vices digital networks (ISDNs) and the final extrapolation of avail-
ability, interoperability, and transparency.
2 0
(20) Vulnerability: Users should have assurance that interde-
pendence is mutual and dependencies are reliable. They should be
reasonably certain that access is available to information stored in
remote data bases in times of crisis or national or personal peril.
In conclusion, the time is ripe for a new level of statesmanship
in the governance of global networks. Society needs less naysaying
about the potential for abuse of global networks and a more dili-
gent effort to achieve their positive benefits for the global family of
nations.
260. See supra note 31.
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